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I. INTRODUCTION 
Currently on the books are dozens of laws mandating 
approval by federal officials every time Indian tribes make certain 
management decisions concerning their “trust” lands, such as 
leasing,1 sale,2 or other real estate transactions.3 While there has 
been a recent trend to free tribes from this federal yoke,4 we are 
still a long way from true tribal autonomy in this area.5 Why can 
Congress give these federal officials, most of them working for the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) within the Department of the 
Interior, the authority to veto tribal actions relating to the 
management of tribal lands and natural resources? The more 
accepted understanding is that the political relationship existing 
between the Indian tribes and the United States is said to be a trust 
                                                 
1.  See, e.g., Indian Long Term Leasing Act of 1955, 25 U.S.C. § 
415(a) (2013); Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-
2108 (2013); American Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act of 
1990, 25 U.S.C. § 3715(a) (2013). 
2. See Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2013). 
3. See 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2013). Before the 2000 amendments to this 
statute, the section mandated Secretarial approval for all transactions made 
with Indians “relative to their lands.” The 2000 amendments narrowed the 
need for Secretarial approval only for those contracts or agreements 
“encumbering” Indian lands for 7 years or more.  
4. See, e.g., The Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible 
Tribal Home Ownership Act, popularly known as the HEARTH Act, 
(amending the Indian Leasing Statute, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2013)) and the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self Determination Act of 2005 (“TERA”), 
Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 119, Stat. 594, 763-79 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-06 
(2013)); see also supra note 3, the amendment to 25 U.S.C. § 81. 
5.  See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy 
Development Under the HEARTH Act: An Independently Rational, But 
Collectively Deficient Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Judith V. 
Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problems of the 
Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91 (2012).    
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relationship. Under this relationship, the United States is said to 
hold tribal lands in trust for the benefit of the tribes. As the trustee, 
Congress is said to have plenary power to manage the property of 
its beneficiary, the Indian tribes.6  
Some scholars have recently argued that the massive 
amount of federal regulations, as well as the myriad of Secretarial 
approval requirements, mandated in the name of the Indian Trust 
doctrine is not only the by-product of paternalistic and racist 
attitudes towards Indians, but is also a major impediment to 
efficient economic development on Indian lands.7 Thus, there have 
been suggestions from established federal Indian law scholars such 
as Kevin Gover,8 and Stacy Leads,9 that the trust doctrine has been 
a failure,10 and should be abandoned, or at least severely modified, 
especially when it comes to control of Indian natural resources. At 
least one commentator argued that recent changes in the law make 
it ripe to revisit the legality of legislation such as the General 
Allotment Act,11 originally enacted in 1887.12 These scholars take 
the position that when it comes to management of Tribally owned 
lands and control of tribal natural resources, the trust doctrine is 
anachronistic and a serious impediment to both tribal self-
government and economic development.  
While I generally agree with these scholars, in this article I 
focus on providing legal arguments for challenging the validity of 
                                                 
6.  See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902). 
7.  See Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling 
Native Sovereignty and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290 (2009).    
8.  Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 
46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 217 (2006). 
9.  Stacy Leeds, Moving Towards Exclusive Tribal Autonomy 
over Lands and Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439 (2006). 
10.  See generally Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary 
Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1185–89 (2014) (pointing to the 
Indian Trust Doctrine as just one example of many where the notion of 
governance by a fiduciary has failed). 
11. Indian General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
12. See Mary K. Nagle, Nothing to Trust: The Unconstitutional 
Origins of the Post Dawes Act Trust Doctrine, 48 TULSA L. REV. 63 (2012) 
(hereinafter Nothing to Trust).   
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many of the statutes allegedly enacted by Congress pursuant to the 
Indian Trust Doctrine. Many of the laws imposing federal control 
over tribal land management decisions have their roots in the late 
1800’s and early 1900’s. Congress was said to have absolute power 
to manage tribal lands because such land was said to be held in trust 
by the United States, and efforts to challenge such authority were 
rejected based on the political question doctrine.13 In this article, I 
argue that it is a mistake to think that the United States has actual 
“trust” title to much of the 56 million acres comprising the tribal 
land base.14 I also argue that it is wrong to take the position 
Congress still has plenary, in the sense of being absolute, authority 
over the land management decisions of Indian tribes.15 
Furthermore, starting in 1974 with Morton v. Mancari,16 the Court 
began to allow substantial judicial review under the Equal 
Protection Clause to challenge Indian-specific legislation and 
eventually rejected application of the political question doctrine to 
block challenges to Federal Indian legislation.17  
At issue in the landmark Mancari decision was whether a 
law giving preference in employment to Indians applying for jobs 
within the BIA was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal 
protection principle derived from the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process clause. The Supreme Court held that it was not. Crucial to 
its holding was the finding that this preference does not constitute 
racial discrimination because “[t]he preference, as applied, is 
granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as 
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”18 Since strict scrutiny 
was not applicable, the Mancari Court concluded by holding that 
                                                 
13. Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
14. See infra notes 238-60. I first heard of such an argument from 
Professor Robert Clinton during a presentation he made at Arizona State 
University Sandra Day O’Connor School of Law in April 2011. See also 
INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, NATIVE LAND LAW, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF LAW RELATING TO NATIVE LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES (Thomson 
Reuters, 2013-2014 Lawyers Ed.) [hereinafter Native Land Law]. 
15.  See infra notes 135-43.  
16.  417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
17.  See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). 
18.  Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554. 
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because the preference was “reasonably and directly related to a 
legitimate, nonracially based goal,”19 promoting tribal self-
government, it would survive the equal protection challenge. As to 
why the classification was not racial, the Court offered two 
alternative explanations. First, it stated that the Indian Commerce 
Clause authorized Congress “to regulate Commerce . . . with the 
Indian Tribes,”20 and “to this extent, [it] singles Indians out as a 
proper subject for separate legislation.”21 However, the Court also 
explained in a footnote that “[t]he preference is not directed 
towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies 
only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to 
exclude many individuals who are racially classified as ‘Indians.’ In 
this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.”22      
Early on, scholars such as Professor David Williams 
attacked the Mancari methodology as being unsound.23 The gist of 
his criticism was that since Indian tribes require their members to 
be of “Indian” ancestry by proving that they are direct descendants 
from some biological Indian ancestors, Mancari was wrong in 
asserting that the classification could not be racial. Invoking the 
proverbial law requiring Indians to sit in the back of the bus, 
Professor Williams insisted that Mancari did not offer Indians 
                                                 
19.  Id. 
20.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
21.  Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 at 551–52. 
 22.  Id. at 553 n.24.  Interestingly, before 1924, the year the Indian 
Citizenship Act became law, most Indians were not United States citizens and 
any classification based on membership in an Indian tribe could have been 
held as being based on alienage and therefore be considered a suspect one for 
the purpose of strict scrutiny.  However, since at issue in Mancari was the 
validity of a federal statute, heightened scrutiny would still not have been 
required.  See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).   In Dawavendewa v. Salt 
River Project, 154 F.3d 1117 (1998), the Ninth Circuit held that a tribal law 
giving preference to members of the Navajo Nation discriminated based on 
national origin and therefore was in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act prohibiting such discrimination. Id. (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (2013)). 
 23.  See David Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection 
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991). 
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enough protection from laws that discriminated against them and 
that there should be a presumption that most classifications of 
Indians were, in effect, made on racial grounds. Others, notably 
Professor Carole Goldberg, disagreed. Professor Goldberg noted 
that Professor Williams’ approach would jeopardize most of Title 
25, the Title of the United States Code containing most laws 
enacted specifically for the benefit of Indians. As stated by the 
Mancari Court, “[l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with 
Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing 
with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of 
tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived 
from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only 
Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire 
Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively 
erased.”24 Rather than focusing and relying on the Mancari 
footnote, Professor Goldberg argued that the better response to the 
argument that any classification of Indians is primarily “racial” is to 
argue that the special treatment of Indians cannot be considered 
racial because Article I of the Constitution set Indians for special 
treatment by authorizing Congress to regulate Commerce with the 
Indian Tribes.25  Furthermore, Professor Goldberg added that 
Indians could protect themselves from classifications harming them 
by relying on the statement the Court made in Mancari that “[a]s 
long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment 
of Congress’s unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative 
judgment will not be disturbed.” 26   
In this article, while I agree with Professor Goldberg that 
most classifications of Indians are not racial as long as they were 
enacted into law pursuant to Congress’s power under the Indian 
                                                 
24.  Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552; see also Carole Goldberg, Not 
Strictly Racial: A Response to Indians as People, 39 UCLA L. REV. 169 
(1991).   
25.  Carole Goldberg, American Indians and Preferential 
Treatment, 49 UCLA. L. REV. 943 (2002). Article I, section 8, clause 3 states 
that Congress is given the power to “regulate Commerce among the states, 
and with Indian Tribes and Foreign Nations.” 
26.  Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. 
  
 
2015             USING THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION              9 
 
Commerce Clause of Article I, I disagree with the notion that 
Indians can successfully protect themselves from classifications 
harming them by arguing that such classifications are not rationally 
related to Congress’s unique obligations towards Indians. This does 
not mean that Indians are left without any recourse to fight laws 
that discriminate against them. This Article argues that the 
Supreme Court’s new equal protection jurisprudence, as reflected 
in cases such as United States v. Windsor,27 Romer v. Evans,28 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,29 and City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,30 can be applied to Indian 
legislation and protect Indians from laws enacted to their 
disadvantage. While the Court in those four cases did not formerly 
acknowledge that it was dealing with suspect or quasi-suspect 
classes, it developed a jurisprudence under which laws denying 
equal treatment to some groups can be more easily held 
unconstitutional.31  Some scholars interpret these cases as creating a 
heightened level of scrutiny,32 what some have called Second Order 
Rational Basis Review,33 or Rational Basis with Bite (“RBB”). 34 
Others have argued that these cases all involve legislation driven by 
unconstitutional animus towards unpopular groups.35 Here, I will 
argue that under either of those two theories, Federal Indian 
                                                 
27.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
28.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
29.  413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
30.  473 U.S. 432 (1985).  
31.  See Suzanne N. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 481 (2004) (noting weak and strong strands in the Court’s approach to 
rational basis review. Id. at 512–18). 
32.  In some way, this heightened level of review mirrors what 
Justice Blackmun was trying to do in Mancari with his “uniquely tied to the 
trust ” test but unlike his, my test does not restrict Indians to make arguments 
related to the Indian Trust Doctrine. 
33.  See Justice Marshall’s Opinion concurring in part dissenting in 
part in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458.   
34.  See Gale Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: 
Intermediate Scrutiny by any Other Name, 62 IND. L. J. 779 (1987). 
35.  See Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from 
Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183 (2013); Susannah W. Pollvogt, 
Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012). 
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legislation imposing restrictions on tribal land management can be 
successfully challenged as a denial of equal protection.  
The Article will proceed as follows: Part II summarizes the 
case law which has used equal protection to challenge Indian 
legislation and set forth the various arguments that have been made 
concerning when Indian legislation amounts to a racial or a political 
classification; Part III explains why Mancari’s “rational tied to the 
trust standard” is inadequate to protect Indians from laws 
discriminating against them; and finally, Part IV explores the level 
of scrutiny which should be used to challenge laws that are not 
considered to involve racial classifications but nevertheless were 
enacted based on a view that Indians were racially inferior, or were 
based on other improper motives, such as animus towards Indian 
people.  
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN RACIAL AND 
POLITICAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
A. The Case Law at the Supreme Court 
1. The Pre-Mancari Cases 
Not surprisingly, cases challenging Federal Control of tribal 
land and property before 195436 did not invoke the Equal 
Protection Clause. These challenges usually failed because 
Congress, as the trustee for the Tribes, was held to have absolute 
power over Indian property.37 For instance, in Tiger v. Western 
Investment Co.,38 Congress imposed more restrictions on the 
alienation of lands by full-blooded members of a tribe than it did on 
lands held by non-full-blood Indians. While the full-blooded 
                                                 
36.  1954 was the year Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), was 
decided. In Bolling, the Court for the first time held that the Equal Protection 
Clause applied to the Federal government because even though it is not 
mentioned in the Fifth Amendment, it is incorporated through its Due Process 
Clause. 
37. See, e.g., Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899); 
Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890). 
38.  221 U.S. 286 (1911). 
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members challenged the restrictions, they never alleged 
discrimination based on race. The Court held that as long as the 
Indians were the wards of the federal government and under its 
tutelage, it was for Congress, and not the courts, to decide what was 
in the best interest of the Indians.    
Whether cases like Tiger v. Western Investment should still 
be considered good law after Bolling and Mancari is the subject of 
this article. My argument is that they should not, although the one 
case decided between Bolling and Mancari, Simmons v. Eagle 
Seelatsee,39 shows the issue is not free from doubt. The issue in 
Eagle Seelatsee was whether an Act of Congress restricting 
inheritance in any part of the estate of a Yakima tribal member 
held under restricted or trust status to those enrolled tribal 
members possessing at least one fourth of Yakima Indian blood, 
was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs in the 
case were arguing that the law discriminated based on race and was 
a violation of the Due Process Clause because it bore no reasonable 
relation to the guardianship the United States has over Indians. 
Relying on the plenary power of Congress over Indian tribal 
relations and property as enunciated in Tiger v. Western 
Investment, the United States District Court upheld the law on the 
grounds that “Congress was doing no more than defining what 
constituted membership in the Yakima Tribes.”40 Interestingly, the 
court seemed to acknowledge that the classification was based on 
race when it stated, “[i]t is plain the Congress, on numerous 
occasions, has deemed it expedient, and within its powers, to 
classify Indians according to their percentage of Indian blood. 
Indeed, if legislation is to deal with Indians at all, the very reference 
to them implies the use of ‘a criterion of race.’ Indians can only be 
defined by their race.”41 Nevertheless, the court still adopted the 
lowest level of scrutiny, the rational basis test, and stated, 
“[n]ecessarily, continued intermarriage with white persons would 
ultimately produce persons who were in no true sense Indians. At 
                                                 
39.  244 F. Supp. 808 (1965), aff’d without op., 384 U.S. 209 (1966).  
40.  Id. at 814. 
41.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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some reasonable point a line must be drawn between Indians and 
non-Indians.”42   
In its last footnote, the court warned that a “logical 
application of plaintiff’s position respecting the unconstitutionality 
of ‘a criterion of race’ would cast doubt on the constitutionality of 
all such legislation”43 dealing specifically with Indians. Among the 
many statutes the court was afraid would be endangered were the 
following: limitations on Indians making contracts without 
Secretarial approval; limitations on the rights of white men 
marrying Indian women; limitations on sending Indian children to 
school out of state; and restrictions on leasing of Indian land 
without Secretarial approval.44 This article argues that these 
statutes should today be held unconstitutional and decisions like 
Eagle Seelatsee overturned.                
2. Mancari and its Progeny 
Mancari’s major innovation and its departure from the line 
of reasoning exemplified in Eagle Seelatsee was that the 
classification of Indians did not have to be considered racial but 
could be political. The Court started its analysis by announcing that 
“[r]esolution of the instant issue turns on the unique legal status of 
Indian tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power of 
Congress based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 
“guardian ward” status, to legislate on behalf of federally 
recognized Indian tribes.”45 It ended by concluding that laws 
rationally tied to Congress’s unique obligations towards the Indians 
would not be disturbed.46   
Ever since the decision, there has been a debate concerning 
the meaning of this last sentence. Was the Court, as some scholars 
were hoping, announcing a new Rational Basis “plus” test, under 
which the special treatment of Indians could not be tied to any 
                                                 
42.  Id. at 815.  
43.  Id. at 814. 
44.  Id. 
45.  417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). 
46.  Id. at 555. 
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legitimate federal interest, but only to Congress’s fulfillment of its 
unique obligations towards Indians?47 Or, was the Court stating 
that it was only when the legislation was tied to Congress’s unique 
obligations towards Indians that it did not amount to a racial 
classification triggering a heightened level of judicial review? 
Finally, how did one determine when a law was “tied to Congress’s 
unique obligations towards the Indians?” Congress’s unique 
obligations towards Indians are hard to define because the trust 
doctrine has many origins. Most scholars trace its beginning to 
Chief Justice Marshall’s famous utterance in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia that the relationship between the United States and the 
tribes resembled that of a guardian to its ward.48 Others, like 
Professor Mary Wood, have argued that the trust doctrine emerged 
from the huge land transfers that took place between the United 
States and the tribes through treaties or Acts of Congress.49 
Professor Robert Miller agrees the doctrine originated from land 
transfers, but traces it to the land transfers that took place as a 
result of the doctrine of discovery according to which the United 
States obtained “ultimate title” to all Indian lands.50   
Any discussion of the trust doctrine is further complicated 
by the lack of consistent understanding of what the doctrine 
actually is. According to Professor Mary Wood, the first version of 
the Indian Trust Doctrine, devised by Chief Justice John Marshall, 
was that the trust relationship between the tribes and the United 
States was there to protect the continuing existence of tribes as self-
governing sovereign entities.51 The second iteration of the doctrine, 
however, developed during the Allotment era between the 1880’s 
and the 1920’s, was not so benign to Indians.52  Its main purpose 
                                                 
47.  See Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal 
Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979). 
48.  30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
49.  Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native 
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471 (1994). 
50.  Robert J. Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered: 
Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny, 166 (2006). 
51.  See Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 49.  
52.  See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913) (holding 
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was to give plenary power to the federal government over Indian 
land, natural resources, and people,53 beyond the limits of the 
Indian Commerce Clause.54   In United States v. Kagama,55 the 
Court famously stated “[t]hese Indian tribes are the wards of the 
nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. 
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the 
course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the 
treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of 
protection, and with it the power.”56  
In the years shortly following Mancari, the Supreme Court, 
in four cases, had a chance to further explain its Mancari reasoning. 
In all these cases, the federal laws at issue were upheld. The first 
case in which the Court dealt with an equal protection claim after 
Mancari was Fisher v. District Court.57 The Court held that a law 
denying Indians access to state courts was neither racial 
discrimination, nor a denial of equal protection. After stating that 
“[t]he exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive 
from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign 
status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe,”58 the Court, citing 
Mancari, concluded that even if this jurisdictional holding resulted 
in denying Indians access to a forum to which non-Indians had 
access, “such disparate treatment of the Indians is justified because 
                                                                                                             
that the Pueblos of New Mexico qualified as Indians for the purposes of 
having a trust relationship with the federal government because they were 
“essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.”) Id. at 39. 
53.   See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Cherokee 
Nation, 187 U.S. 294. 
54.   Id. at 378-79. See also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the 
Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 247 (2003) 
(arguing that in Mancari and other cases, the Court integrated the trust 
doctrine into the Constitution so as to boost legislative power under the 
Indian Commerce Clause and allow Congress to pass legislation for the 
benefit of Indians even if such legislation went beyond “Commerce” with the 
Indian tribes). 
55.   118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886). 
56.   118 U.S. at 383-84. 
57.   424 U.S. 382 (1976). 
58.   Id. at 390. 
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it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by 
furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government.”59 
That same year, the Court also used Mancari to set aside a state 
challenge to a tax immunity conferred on Indians.60 The state 
argued that such immunity violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. Relying on Mancari, the Court stated, “[t]he test 
to be applied to these kinds of statutory preferences, which we said 
were neither ‘invidious’ nor ‘racial’ in character, governs here: ‘As 
long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to Congress’s 
unique obligation towards Indians, such legislative judgment will 
not be disturbed.’”61  
In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,62 a group 
of tribal descendants who had been omitted from a per capita 
distribution pursuant to a judgment of the Court of Claims sued 
claiming discrimination and denial of equal protection. After 
overruling previous cases that had shielded such legal challenges 
under the political question doctrine, the Court nevertheless upheld 
the law, stating that the Court of Claims’ omission of the plaintiffs 
from the distribution list was “tied rationally to the fulfillment of 
Congress’ [sic] unique obligation toward the Indians.”63 Although 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, argued that the omission of plaintiffs 
from the distribution was arbitrary and more the result of a 
legislative oversight than “the product of an actual legislative 
choice,”64 there was in fact a valid reason tied to the trust for the 
omission: limiting the class of beneficiaries to Indians who were still 
members of a federally recognized tribe having a trust relationship 
with the United States.65 Although the Court used Mancari’s 
language in a manner which suggested a higher level of scrutiny, 
Justice Stevens’ dissent indicates that the majority could not have 
                                                 
59 . Id. at 391. 
60.  Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the 
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
61.  Id. at 480 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555). 
62.  430 U.S. 73 (1977). 
63.  Id. at 85 (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).  
64. Id. at 98. 
65.  Id. at 85. 
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used more than regular rational basis review, a hallmark of which is 
to allow courts to come up with any kind of rational basis 
supporting any possible legitimate federal interest without inquiring 
further into the real motivations of the legislature. 
In the next case, United States v. Antelope,66 the Court 
never mentioned the ‘“rationally tied to Congress’ [sic] unique 
obligations” test in upholding the law. At issue was a law that 
subjected Indians to a federal criminal law containing a felony 
murder provision which was not applicable to similar crimes 
committed by non-Indians being prosecuted in state courts 
pursuant to state laws. Unlike Mancari, this law was not favorable 
to Indians since it imposed a stiffer penalty for essentially the same 
crime when committed by an Indian instead of a non-Indian.  Yet, 
the Court found that “federal regulation of Indian affairs is not 
based upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is 
rooted in the unique status of Indians as “a separate people with 
their own political institutions.”67 The case is interesting because 
after stating that “classifications expressly singling out Indian 
tribes” does not involve racial classifications because it is “expressly 
provided for in the Constitution,”68 the Court seemed to adopt the 
position that any Federal law related to the “governance of once-
sovereign political communities,” cannot be “viewed as legislation 
of a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians.’”69 In other words, the 
Mancari framework seemed to have shifted to one where any 
legislation aimed at the governance of tribes cannot be considered 
“racial,” irrespective of whether it only applied to members of 
Indian tribes rather than to all Indians. Furthermore, once the 
legislation is found not to make racial classifications, garden-variety 
rational basis seems to apply.70   
One possible way to read Antelope as being consistent with 
                                                 
66. 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
67.  Id. at 646. 
68.  Id. at 645. 
69.  Id. at 646 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24).  
70.  For instance, the Court stated “respondents do not seriously 
contend that application of federal law to Indian tribes is so irrational as to 
deny equal protection.” Id. at 647 n.8. 
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Mancari is to take the position that the Antelope Court understood 
Mancari to have used the “tied rationally to Congress’s unique 
obligations” test because Mancari involved giving preference to 
Indians in a non-reservation setting. The Mancari Court, therefore, 
wanted to make sure that the law was related to the governance of 
Indian tribes and was indeed enacted pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce Clause. In Antelope, where the law was only affecting 
reservation Indians, and was so clearly related to the governance of 
Indian tribes, it was not necessary to mention the “rationally tied to 
Congress’ unique obligations” test.   
The Court revisited this issue a couple of years later in 
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima 
Indian Nation.71 In that case, Indian plaintiffs were arguing that the 
State of Washington’s implementation of Public Law 280, a federal 
law allowing states to exercise some criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians on Indian reservations, was so arbitrary and irrational that 
it denied them due process and equal protection of the laws under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was complicated by the fact 
that, unlike the previous three cases, this case involved a challenge 
to a state law enacted pursuant to delegation of federal authority to 
the state, an entity not having, at least initially, a trust relationship 
with Indian tribes. However, the Court held that this did not matter 
because “[i]n enacting Chapter 36, Washington was legislating 
under explicit authority granted by Congress in the exercise of that 
federal power.”72 In upholding the law against the equal protection 
challenge, the Court did not dwell on why the law did not amount 
to a racial classification and, citing only to Mancari, bluntly asserted 
“[i]t is settled that ‘the unique legal status of Indian tribes under 
federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact legislation 
singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be 
constitutionally offensive.”73 Having made that decision, the Court 
used what it called a “conventional Equal Protection Clause 
criteria,” and stated, “legislative classifications are valid unless they 
                                                 
71.  439 U.S. 463 (1979).  
72.  Id. at 501.  
73.  Id. at 500-01 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-52). 
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bear no rational relationship to the State’s objectives.”74 That 
standard was easily met.      
The last Supreme Court case directly evaluating the 
applicability of Mancari was Rice v. Cayetano.75 At issue was 
whether a state law restricting voting for selection of trustees to the 
State’s Office of Hawaiian Affairs to Native Hawaiians, violated the 
15th Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits voting 
restrictions based on race.76 “Native Hawaiian” was defined to 
mean people who could trace their ancestry to persons living on the 
Islands before the arrival of the first European in 1778. The Court 
held the voting restrictions unconstitutional because “ancestry can 
be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here.”77   
The State tried to argue that under Mancari, the 
classification of Native Hawaiians was not a “racial” classification. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found Mancari inapplicable 
to the case at hand. After acknowledging that “Congress may fulfill 
its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to Indian tribes by 
enacting legislation dedicated to their circumstances and needs,”78 
Justice Kennedy found that although the classification involved in 
Mancari had a racial component, “the preference was “not directed 
towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians,’” but rather “only to 
members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.”79 On the level of review 
used in Mancari, Justice Kennedy summarized his interpretation of 
the case by stating, “[b]ecause the BIA preference could be “tied 
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligation toward 
the Indians,” and was “reasonable and rationally designed to 
further Indian self-government,” the Court held that it did not 
                                                 
74.  Id. 
75.  528 U.S. 495 (2000).  
76.  Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment states “The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.” U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1. 
77.  Rice, 528 U.S. at 514. 
78.  Id. at 519. 
79.  Id. at 519-20 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24). 
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offend the Constitution.”80 Justice Kennedy also stated that the 
reason tribal elections established by federal statutes can restrict 
non-tribal members from voting was because these were elections 
for the internal governance of quasi sovereign tribes while this case 
involved elections to a state office, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. 
Although there were five Justices who signed the Rice 
majority opinion, Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion joined 
by Justice Souter, which offered a very different analysis. Their 
concurring opinion took the position that the classification was 
based on race because there was no “trust” for native Hawaiians, 
and native Hawaiians did not “sufficiently resemble an Indian 
tribe.”81 In other words, it seemed that for Justices Breyer and 
Souter, the key element in deciding whether the classification is one 
based on race was whether the legislation was enacted pursuant to a 
“trust” relationship. Justice Stevens joined by Justice Ginsburg 
wrote a dissenting opinion agreeing with Justice Breyer that the 
existence of a trust relationship was the determinative factor in 
deciding whether the voting restrictions amounted to a racial 
classification. According to Justice Stevens, however, “[a]s the 
history recited by the majority reveals, the grounds for recognizing 
the existence of federal trust power here are overwhelming.”82 
Among those grounds, according to Justice Stevens, was that the 
United States came into possession of 1.8 million acres of land 
expropriated from Native Hawaiians. After mentioning as another 
factor the 150 laws enacted by Congress to implement its trust 
duties that also included Native Hawaiians as Native Americans, 
Justice Stevens concluded, “[t]he descendants of the Native 
Hawaiians share with the descendants of the Native Americans on 
the mainland or in the Aleutian Islands not only a history of 
subjugation at the hands of colonial forces, but also a purposefully 
created and specialized “‘guardian-ward’ relationship with the 
Government of the United States.”83 
In conclusion, while four Justices agreed that the crucial 
                                                 
80.  Id. at 520 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555). 
81.  Id. at 525 (Breyer, J. concurring).  
82.  Id. at 532 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
83.  Id. at 534.  
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factor in determining whether a classification was racial was 
whether the law was enacted pursuant to a trust relationship, 
Justice Kennedy speaking for a majority of five was ambivalent on 
that point. Although he mentioned that Congress does have the 
power to “fulfill its treaty obligations” to tribes by enacting 
legislation treating Indians differently,84 he also seemed to rely on 
the fact that legislation dealing with Native Americans is not racial 
when it is not directed to Indians as a group but “only to members 
of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.”85   
Rice, along with cases such as Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena,86 the leading case restricting the use of race in granting 
preference in the acquisition of government benefits, gave hope to 
some that Rice was announcing the imminent demise of Mancari.87 
That did not happen, as the Court has not yet revisited Mancari 
since the 2000 decision in Rice. Yet, because of a lack of conclusive 
direction from the Supreme Court, the political versus racial 
classification debate has been active in the lower courts. Some 
commentators have recently remarked that Mancari and its 
“political not racial” methodology has been under constant attack 
both in the courts and by scholars.88 In response to such attacks, 
some scholars have recently made the argument that the very 
                                                 
84.  Id. at 519 (majority opinion).  
85.  Id. at 519–20.  It is interesting to compare Rice with a later 
case, Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2004), which involved a 
group of Native Hawaiians claiming that after Rice, a Department of Interior 
regulation prohibiting Native Hawaiians from petitioning the federal 
government to be recognized as an Indian tribe amounted to racial 
discrimination since all other Native American groups in the continental 
United States were eligible to petition the government for recognition as 
Indian tribes. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating “the recognition of Indian 
tribes remains a political, rather than a racial determination. Recognition of 
political entities, unlike classifications made on the basis of race or national 
origin are not subject to heightened scrutiny.” Id. at 1279. 
86.  515 U.S. 200 (1995).  
87.  See Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament 
of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 736–43 (2001). 
88.  Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The 
Unrelenting Assault on Morton v. Mancari, 60-APR FED. LAW 47 (2013) 
[hereinafter Apocalypse Now]. 
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dichotomy the Court made in Mancari, between racial or political, 
was inadequate because the classification of Indians can be both 
racial and political.89 Besides, encouraging courts to debate which 
laws classify Indians based on race and which ones do not may 
needlessly lead courts into unchartered and difficult territory with 
no clear answers on how such determinations should be made.90 
These scholars take the position that any laws enacted pursuant to 
the trust doctrine for the benefit of Indians should be upheld 
without the courts debating whether the classification is “racial” or 
“political.”91 As the next section shows, however, the case law does 
not endorse this view.  
B. The Case Law in the Lower Courts 
In the lower courts, the debate surrounding what laws 
involve a racial classification has not centered on whether a given 
law only affects members of Indian tribes or whether it affects all 
Indians. Instead, determining whether a law amounts to a racial 
classification has depended on whether it was enacted pursuant to 
the trust doctrine, it affected “uniquely Indian interests,”92 or it was 
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. In all the cases, 
whether the law only applies to Indians on Indian reservations or 
extends beyond reservation borders is an important factor. Laws 
only applying on reservations, as was the case in Antelope, will in 
all likelihood be considered non-racial classifications, and will 
therefore be upheld.  Laws regulating or benefiting Indian tribes or 
their members beyond the reservation borders, as was the case in 
Mancari, are more difficult to assess when it comes to determining 
if they involve racial classifications. The problem with this view is 
that the two sources of congressional power most frequently cited 
                                                 
89. See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian 
Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 958 (2011). 
90.  See Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and 
Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1165 (2010). 
91.  See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, 
and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041 (2012). 
92.  See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997).  
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as granting power to Congress over Indian affairs, the Indian 
Commerce Clause and the Indian Trust Doctrine, do not contain 
any territorial limitations on the extent of congressional power. 
This was made clear in a couple of early cases, the first one using 
the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of power, the other one 
the Indian Trust Doctrine.  
 One of the first Supreme Court cases recognizing 
congressional power beyond the reservation’s border was United 
States v. Holliday:93  
 
If Commerce, or traffic, or intercourse, is carried on 
with an Indian tribe, or with a member of such tribe, 
it is subject to be regulated by Congress, although 
within the limits of a State. The locality of the traffic 
can have nothing to do with the power. The right to 
exercise it in reference to any Indian tribe, or any 
person who is a member of such tribe, is absolute, 
without reference to the locality of the traffic, or the 
locality of the tribe, or of the member of the tribe 
with whom it is carried on.94 
 
                                                 
93.  70 U.S. 407 (1865). 
94.  Id. at 418.  Some States have made a concerted effort to 
challenge congressional power over Indian Affairs beyond the reservations’ 
borders by invoking the Tenth Amendment which states that “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” However, 
except for one state court decision, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. 
Super. Ct., 148 P.3d 1126 (Cal. 2006), which involved tribal violations of state 
election laws, these efforts have failed. See Roseville v. Norton, 219 F. Supp. 
2d 130, 138–39 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Carcieri v. 
Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 180 (D.R.I. 2003), rev’d on other grounds sub 
nom., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); Prairie Band of Potawatomi v. 
Wagnon, 476 F.3d 818, 829 (10th Cir. 2007).  Although some courts have held 
that without the Existing Indian Family doctrine, some parts of ICWA would 
be in violation of Tenth Amendment, see In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Reptr. 2d 
692, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), this position has not been endorsed by the vast 
majority of courts that have considered the issue. See infra notes 122–29.     
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The second case, Perrin v. United States,95 concerned federal 
power to prohibit liquor in areas once occupied, but subsequently 
ceded, by an Indian tribe. Although the Perrin Court found some 
limits to congressional power in areas no longer part of Indian 
Country, it nevertheless reaffirmed federal power in the case: 
 
As the power is incident only to the presence of the 
Indians and their status as wards of the government, 
it must be conceded that it does not go beyond what 
is reasonably essential to their protection, and that, 
to be effective, its exercise must not be purely 
arbitrary, but founded upon some reasonable basis.96     
 
A good example of the “on” versus “off” Indian land 
dichotomy is provided by contrasting two Ninth Circuit decisions, 
both originating from Alaska. At issue in Alaska Chapter v. 
Pierce,97 was a regulation issued by the federal Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) directing Indian 
housing authorities building low-income housing in remote Native 
American villages to give preference to Indian owned enterprises in 
awarding federal contracts. The lawsuit alleged that this preference 
violated equal protection. The district court agreed, construing 
Mancari’s political classification as applying only to laws designed 
to further tribal self-government.98 After rejecting this 
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[i]f 
the preference in fact furthers Congress’s special obligation, then a 
fortiori it is a political rather than racial classification, even though 
racial criteria might be used in defining who is an eligible Indian.”99 
Having thus defined the test to distinguish racial from political 
classifications, the court had no trouble concluding that the 
regulation was rationally related to Congress’s fulfillment of its 
                                                 
95. 232 U.S. 478 (1914). 
96.  Id. at 486.  
97.  Alaska Ch., Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. 
Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982). 
98.  Id. at 1167. 
99.  Id. at 1169.   
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trust responsibility since its purpose was to encourage and develop 
leadership skills among Indian-owned businesses to “help the 
Indians develop economic self-sufficiency.”100 In other words, the 
court seemed to agree with the district court that Mancari’s 
“rationally tied to Congress’s unique obligations” test determined 
whether the classification was racial or political. However, while the 
district court took an extremely narrow view of what is or is not 
related to implementing the trust, the Court of Appeals adopted a 
much more expansive definition, stating that “[t]he Ninth Circuit 
has applied Mancari to Indian interests broader than self-
government.”101 On the date of the decision, 1982, activities 
occurring in Native Alaskan Villages were still considered as taking 
place on Indian lands. This would no longer be the case after the 
Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Alaska v. Native Village. of 
Venetie Tribal Government, which held that lands reserved to 
Alaskan Native entities under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (ANCSA) did not qualify as Indian Country.102  
While pretending not to disagree with Alaska Chapter, 
Judge Kozinski adopted a much different approach a few years 
later in Williams v. Babbitt.103 At issue in the case was the 
correctness of an administrative court’s interpretation of the 
Reindeer Industry Act, which interpreted the statute as prohibiting 
non-Native Alaskans from entering the Reindeer industry.  Relying 
heavily on Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and Justice Stevens’ 
dissent in that case,104 the Ninth Circuit found that because the 
administrative interpretation allowed a racial preference for 
                                                 
100.  Id. at 1170. 
101.  Id. at 1169.  
102.  522 U.S. 520 (1998). Thus, in Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 42 
F. Supp. 2d 927 (D. Alaska 1998), the court held that Alaska Native 
preference in employment ordinance issued by a subdivision of the State of 
Alaska was a racial preference subject to strict scrutiny. 
103.  115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).  
104.  515 U.S. 200 (1995). After remarking that in Adarand, Justice 
Stevens had argued that the majority equated the discrimination against 
African Americans with the preference given to Indians, Judge Kozinski 
concluded, “[i]f Justice Stevens is right about the logical implications of 
Adarand, Mancari’s days are numbered.” Id. at 244.    
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Indians subject to strict scrutiny, it created a serious constitutional 
doubt as to the validity of the statute. Therefore, invoking the 
constitutional avoidance rule,105 the Circuit held that it did not have 
to give deference to the administrative interpretation, and opted to 
construe the statute as not creating such preference. In order to 
come to this holding, Judge Kozinski had to first find that the 
classification was racial and not political. While acknowledging that 
“Mancari is not necessarily limited to statutes that give special 
treatment to Indians on Indian land,”106 the court limited Mancari’s 
reach as “shielding only those statutes that affect uniquely Indian 
interests.”107     
The question after Williams was: what exactly is a law 
“affecting uniquely Indian interests?” Judge Kozinski stated, 
“[l]egislation that relates to Indian land, tribal status, self-
government or culture passes Mancari’s rational relation test 
because “such regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as 
‘a separate people’ with their own political institutions.”108 
Attempting to normatively justify this limitation, Judge Kozinski 
stated that “[a]s ‘a separate people,’ Indians have a right to expect 
some special protection for their land, political institutions . . . and 
culture.”109 This is not much in terms of normative justifications, 
although one scholar has picked up the challenge, and gave a much 
more involved and detailed justification for this limitation on 
Mancari’s reach.110 Judge Kozinski ended that part of the analysis 
by announcing, “we seriously doubt that Congress could give 
Indians a complete monopoly on the casino industry or on space 
                                                 
105.  This is the canon of statutory construction according to which 
statutes are supposed to be interpreted, if at all possible, so as to avoid serious 
doubts as to their constitutionality. 
106.  115 F.3d at 665. 
107.  Id.  
108.  Id. at 664 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 
(1977)).  
109.  Id. 
110.  See David Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 22 (making 
a constitutionally based argument that only statutes which regulate Indians as 
distinct and separate Peoples do not amount to racial classifications. All other 
Indian classifications do and should be subject to strict scrutiny). 
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shuttle contracts.”111 As examined next, two later circuit court 
cases, one by the Ninth Circuit, disagreed with that evaluation.  
The legitimacy of casino monopoly was at play in Artichoke 
Joe’s v. Norton.112 At issue in that case was a challenge by a non-
Indian casino owner to a California law granting a monopoly over 
certain types of casino gaming to Indian tribes. The main question 
was whether the classification was racial or political.113 The Ninth 
Circuit had to address the different approaches in its previous 
decisions in Alaska Chapter and Williams. After acknowledging 
that the court in Alaska Chapter “suggested that, so long as a 
federal statute evinced a rational relationship to Congress’s trust 
obligations towards Indians, it involved a political classification,”114 
it remarked that in Williams, it had “more recently . . . suggested 
that the political-versus-racial classification is not always easy to 
                                                 
111.  Williams, 115 F.3d at 665.    
112.  Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
113.  The other main issue was whether Mancari controlled since 
this involved a state and not a federal law. The Court held that because the 
state law was directly enacted pursuant to a federal law, the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2013), under the previous 
Supreme Court decision in Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of 
the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979), Mancari was applicable. See 
supra notes 56–59. A more critical perspective was recently adopted by the 
First Circuit in KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2012), where the Court overturned the dismissal of a complaint filed by a non-
Indian gaming concern arguing that the State law allowing only Indian tribes 
to negotiate gaming compacts with the State constituted race based 
preference. Distinguishing both Artichoke Joe’s and Washington v. 
Confederated Bands and Tribes because in this case the Tribe did not, and 
may never, possess what IGRA defined as Indian lands, the Court stated that 
“[i]t would be difficult to conclude that the IGRA ‘authorizes’ the 
Massachusetts statute under these circumstances—where there are no Indian 
lands in Region C at present within the meaning of IGRA.” Patrick, 693 F.3d 
at 21. The Court therefore concluded by stating “We simply cannot say that 
KG’s equal protection claim as to section 91 fails to state a claim on which 
relief may be granted.” Id. at 27.           
114.  Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 734. 
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identify.”115 The court went on to distinguish Williams on the 
grounds that here the preference was given pursuant to the federal 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),116 that the statute only 
affected Indian tribes, rather than individual Indians, and only 
pertained to activities on Indian lands. Thus, the court ended by 
stating that because “IGRA pertains to Indian lands and to tribal 
self-government and tribal status of federally recognized tribes, . . . 
under Mancari, rational-basis review applies.”117 Describing Judge 
Kozinski’s reference to casino monopoly as dictum, the court 
nevertheless adopted his approach, implicitly recognizing that 
William’s “uniquely Indian interests” limitation covered any statute 
“relating to tribal self-government, to tribal status, or to Indian 
lands.”118  
One of the questions left open after the case was whether 
any statute covering non-reservation based activities would have to 
be tied to tribal self-government in order to avoid strict scrutiny. A 
year later, in American Federation of Government Employees v. 
United States,119 the D.C. Circuit had to decide such a case which 
also involved something similar to the second example given by 
Judge Kozinski, government contracts involving the space shuttle. 
At issue was the constitutionality of a provision in the Defense 
Appropriations Act granting outsourcing preference to tribally 
owned defense contractors. The case was more difficult than 
previous cases because the preference extended beyond Indian 
activities on or near reservations, and it did not seem to involve 
tribal self-government, at least not directly, or for that matter, 
uniquely Indian interests. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
law stating:  
 
                                                 
115.  Id. 
116.  25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.   
117.  Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 736.  Artichoke Joe’s was followed 
by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Garrett, 122 Fed. App’x. 628 (4th Cir. 
2004). 
118.  Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 735.  
119.  Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps, AFL-CIO v. United States, 330 
F.3d 513 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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The critical consideration is Congress’ power to 
regulate commerce “with the Indian tribes.” While 
Congress may use this power to regulate tribal 
members, regulation of commerce with tribes is at 
the heart of the Clause, particularly when the tribal 
commerce is with the federal government, as it is 
here. When Congress exercises this constitutional 
power it necessarily must engage in classifications 
that deal with Indian tribes.120     
 
The difference between the D.C. Circuit’s approach in this 
case and the Ninth Circuit’s is that it based its ruling strictly on the 
constitutional text and the power Congress derived from the Indian 
Commerce Clause. The court did not put any emphasis on 
determining whether the classification was racial or political, or 
based on whether it was enacted pursuant to congressional trust 
obligations because it affected uniquely Indian interests.  
Challenges to the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) in 
cases involving Indian children located off Indian reservations have 
also involved interesting equal protection arguments.121 ICWA is 
the most far-reaching congressional legislation protecting tribal 
interests beyond reservation borders.122 For instance, ICWA allows 
for concurrent tribal and state jurisdiction for child custody 
proceedings involving an Indian child even when such child does 
not reside on the reservation. In addition, the law allows for 
transfer of such cases from state to tribal courts in the absence of 
good cause or objections by either parent. The Act also mandates 
an Indian placement preference even when the state court keeps 
jurisdiction over such cases. 
Some states have fought application of ICWA in cases 
where there is no “Existing Indian Family,” on the grounds that in 
the absence of such a family, the law amounts to a violation of 
                                                 
120.  Id. at 521-22.   
121.  25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (2012). 
122.  See generally Patrice Kunesh, Border Beyond Borders—
Protecting Essential Tribal Relations off Reservations Under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 42 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 15 (2007). 
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substantive due process, equal protection, and is in contravention of 
the rights guaranteed to the States under the 10th Amendment of 
the Constitution.123 The equal protection argument, as stated in In 
re Bridget R., is based on the fact that “any application of ICWA 
which is triggered by an Indian child’s genetic heritage, without 
substantial social, cultural, or political affiliations between the 
child’s family and a tribal community, is an application based solely, 
or at least predominantly, upon race and is subject to strict scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”124 This line of reasoning is 
subject to the criticism that under the Act, an “Indian child” is 
defined as a child who is a tribal member or who is eligible for 
membership in a tribe. Therefore, the Act conforms with Mancari’s 
holding that the classification is not racial when it only affects 
Indians who also are tribal members. Perhaps this is the reason why 
a court in In re Santos Y., another California case adopting Bridget 
R’s equal protection analysis, also concluded that more recent cases 
“have focused on the text of Mancari, rather than on the footnote 
language that characterized the BIA preference as more political 
than racial, and have limited application of the rational basis test to 
legislation involving uniquely Indian concerns.”125 Citing Judge 
Kozinski’s analysis in Williams v. Babbitt,126 the court went on to 
conclude, without giving any kind of explanation, that “we . . . do 
not find child custody or dependency proceedings to involve 
uniquely Native American concerns.”127 Child custody proceedings, 
generally speaking, are, of course, not “uniquely” an Indian 
concern. However, it seems disingenuous to argue that child 
custody proceedings involving only Indian children who are tribal 
members or eligible for tribal membership are not a uniquely tribal 
                                                 
123.  The leading case advocating the requirement of an existing 
Indian family before ICWA can be applied is In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 
4th 1483 (Cal Ct. App. 1996).   
124.  Id. at 1509.  The court went on to find that without an existing 
Indian family to protect, the Act did not protect a compelling governmental 
interest by narrowly tailored means.   
125.  In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Reptr. 2d at 730. 
126.  115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997). 
127.  In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730. 
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interest. Professor Kunesh put it well when, after observing that the 
unique tribal interest in its Indian children “coalesces with the 
essentiality of tribal governance in child welfare matters, to 
compose an uber-tribal interest that transcends territorially-defined 
jurisdictional limits,”128 she concluded that “[t]he welfare of Indian 
children lies at the heart of tribal sovereignty.”129   
The debate surrounding the need for an “existing Indian 
family” in order for the classification not to be considered “racial” 
shows the difficulty in basing the level of scrutiny on whether the 
classification is “political” or “racial.” As stated earlier, this article 
is arguing that the determination of whether a classification is racial 
or not should be based on whether the legislation containing the 
classification was enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce 
Clause. If it was, the classification cannot be racial. Otherwise it is.  
In this vein, Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion in the most recent 
Supreme Court case involving ICWA, Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl,130 while coming to the wrong conclusion, is at least more on 
track concerning how these equal protection challenges should be 
decided. While the attorneys for the Adoptive Couple made 
arguments relating to the fact that there was no “existing Indian 
family” in this case, Justice Thomas seemed to have disregarded 
these arguments and instead concurred in the holding that ICWA 
was not applicable in this case but only because he believed that 
Congress did not have the power under the Indian Commerce 
Clause to enact such legislation. Firmly asserting that Congress 
does not have plenary power over Indian affairs, Justice Thomas 
took an incredibly narrow view of the Indian Commerce Clause.131 
Quoting from other cases and scholarly articles, Thomas agreed 
that:  
 
                                                 
128.  Kunesh, Borders Beyond Borders, supra note 122, at 51.  
129.  Id. at 78. 
130.  133 S. Ct. at 2565 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
131.  Justice Thomas seemed to have adopted the views espoused by 
Professor Robert G. Natelson in The Original Understanding of the Indian 
Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007), since the article is cited 
and quoted throughout his concurring opinion.   
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At the time the original Constitution was ratified, 
‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and 
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes. 
. . . [T]he term “commerce with Indian tribes” was 
invariably used during the time of the founding to 
mean “‘trade with Indians.’” . . . [R]egulation of 
Indian commerce generally referred to legal 
structures governing “the conduct of the merchants 
engaged in the Indian trade, the nature of the goods 
they sold, the prices charged, and similar matters.”132      
      
Justice Thomas concluded, therefore, that Congress had no 
power to enact the section of ICWA at issue in the case because 
first, the statute dealt with child custody proceedings, not 
commerce, and secondly, the Constitution gave Congress only the 
power to regulate Commerce with Indian tribes. Yet, according to 
Thomas “the portions of the ICWA at issue here do not regulate 
Indian tribes as tribes” since it applied to “all child proceedings 
involving an Indian child regardless of whether an Indian tribe is 
involved. This case thus does not directly implicate Congress’s 
power to “legislate in respect to Indian tribes.”133 While I agree 
with Justice Thomas that Congress should not be considered to 
have “plenary power” when it comes to its assertion of power over 
Indian tribes, I believe that Congress has “plenary” authority over 
“Indian Affairs” vis-à-vis the states. I also disagree that the 
legislation has to directly regulate the tribes.134  
 
 
                                                 
132.  133 S. Ct. at 2567 (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting Natelson, 
supra note 131, at 216, 216 n.99) (internal citations omitted).   
133.  Id. at 2570 (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 
(2004)) (emphasis in original). 
134.  For an eloquent argument that Congress does have the power 
to enact the Indian Child Welfare Act, see MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, ICWA 
and The Commerce Clause, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE ACT AT 30 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Wenona F. Singel & Kathryn 
E. Fort eds., 2008). 
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C. The Indian Commerce Clause Power as the Determinant Factor 
on Whether the Classification is Racial or Political 
This article takes the position that whether the classification 
is racial or political should be based on whether, in enacting the 
legislation containing the classification, Congress has legislated 
under its Indian Commerce Clause power. This argument, however, 
presupposes some limits on this Congressional power.  The problem 
with the majority of current Supreme Court Justices’ understanding 
of Congress’s power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes is that 
they take the complete opposite position as that of Justice Thomas. 
They do not see the Indian Commerce Clause as having any 
internal limitations. Instead, other provisions of the Constitution 
impose such limits externally. Thus, the Court continues to insist 
that “the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to 
provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of 
Indian Affairs.”135 So, applying the Court’s current view to my 
thesis, as long as the legislation concerns the “field of Indian 
Affairs,” such legislation cannot be considered “racial.”  Such 
position sweeps too broadly and would shield too much legislation 
from strict scrutiny.  
Under the Court’s current view, “plenary” does not mean 
“absolute” power over tribal resources in that Congress cannot 
deny tribes their constitutional rights to vested property rights 
unless the law is enacted pursuant to the trust doctrine and is truly 
for the benefit of the Tribes. Thus, the Court in United States v. 
Sioux Nation had to decide whether the taking of the Black Hills 
from the Sioux in 1877 was done pursuant to the trust relationship, 
or pursuant to Congress’s power of eminent domain in which case 
the Sioux were owed just compensation within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment. While acknowledging that Congress can act 
beyond normal constitutional restrictions if acting as a trustee for 
the tribes, the Court also held that when Congress is not acting as a 
trustee, legislation should be subject to constitutional restrictions.136 
                                                 
135.  See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 
(1989). 
136.  448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980) (“[T]his power to control and manage 
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In other words, under the modern view, the Court may still decide 
to uphold congressional legislation violating other parts of the 
Constitution if such legislation is truly for the benefit of the tribes. 
Professor Clinton once wrote that the Commerce Clause 
gives Congress the “power to regulate commerce with the tribes, 
not the commerce of the tribes.”137 Once we accept that neither 
Congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause nor 
power emanating from the treaties previously entered with Indian 
tribes is plenary in the sense of absolute, we must still determine 
the extent of this power.138 Regulating “Commerce” with Indian 
tribes goes beyond regulation of commercial trade with the tribes. 
As Chief Justice Marshall once stated, Commerce is 
“intercourse,”139 and as some scholars have noted, the original 1790 
Trade and Intercourse Acts regulated much more than just “trade” 
with the Indians.140 Professor Matthew Fletcher recently argued 
that the Indian Commerce Clause “should be interpreted broadly 
to include subject matters beyond the narrow meaning (whatever it 
may be) of Commerce.”141 Professor Fletcher has also argued that 
the Indian Commerce power was in fact conceived as extending to 
every interaction, social or commercial, between Indians and non-
                                                                                                             
[is] not absolute.  While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting 
and advancing the tribe, it [is] subject to limitations inhering in . . . a 
guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions.” Id. (citing United 
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935)).    
137.  Robert N. Clinton, There is no Federal Supremacy Clause for 
Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 113, 259 (2002) (emphasis added).  
138.  See Philip P. Frickey, Native American Exceptionalism in 
Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 473-75 (2005) (arguing that 
abandoning plenary power would still leave a great amount of power to 
Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause and the spending clause).    
139.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
140.  See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 
(2010). Balkin also noted that the constitutional convention originally voted to 
give Congress power to regulate “affairs” with the Indians and there is no 
evidence “that the shift from ‘affairs’ to ‘commerce’ was thought to change the 
meaning or the scope of the powers granted.” Id. at 23 n.82. 
141.  See Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause, supra note 
134.  
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Indians.142 This does not mean, however, that the power is 
unlimited. In subsequent writings, Professor Fletcher drew a 
distinction between congressional power over the tribes’ external 
affairs, which he acknowledged as plenary, and power over the 
tribes’ internal affairs, which he argued should not be.143  
In conclusion, while Congress may enact legislation 
regulating commerce, relations, and interactions between Indians 
and non-Indians, it should not be able to enact laws regulating 
Indian tribes or their lands in areas having nothing to do with such 
interactions. In other words, Congress should not be able to 
regulate internal tribal commerce. Under my thesis, all such 
congressional regulations should be considered racial classifications 
and strict scrutiny should be applicable. Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court has never endorsed such internal limits on the 
Indian Commerce Clause. As previously stated, Professor Carole 
Goldberg argued that even if one adopted a broad view of the 
Indian Commerce power, not classifying any such law as making 
racial classifications was inconsequential because Indians could 
protect themselves from laws negatively affecting them by invoking 
the Mancari’s trust standard.  Under that standard, the legislation in 
question would only be upheld if it was tied to Congress’s unique 
                                                 
142.  Other scholars are agree, noting the early Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Act regulated much more than commercial trade between non-
Indians and the Indian tribes, See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 140, at 24. 
Others disagree. See Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the 
Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 55 (2010) (arguing that the Trade and Intercourse Acts were 
mostly enacted pursuant to the Treaty Power and not the Commerce Power). 
143.  See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN J. CIV. 
RTS. & CIV. LIB 45, 75–78 (2012). In his upcoming article, Gregory Ablavsky 
argues that the drafters of the Constitution never understood the Commerce 
Clause as being a large part of the total power given to Congress over Indian 
affairs, let alone the exclusive one. Instead, the Indian Commerce Clause was 
just a component of a broad Indian Affairs power resting on multiple 
constitutional provisions.  However, even though the constitutional power of 
the United States over Native nations was broad, it was not considered 
plenary by the drafters or other federal officials. See Gregory Ablavsky, 
Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1012 (2015).  
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trust responsibilities towards Indians. In the next Part, I argue that 
the “tied to the trust obligations” standard is not workable, and that 
tribal advocates should therefore look elsewhere for protection.   
II. THE INADEQUACY OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A 
LIMIT ON FEDERAL POWER OVER INDIAN TRIBES 
Although the Court in the modern era seemed to have 
taken the position that the Commerce Clause more than the trust 
doctrine gives Congress plenary authority over Indian Affairs,144 
the Indian Trust Doctrine is still cited as a source of plenary power 
for Congress. Through the years, Congress has used this power 
extensively to control and manage the tribes’ natural resources.145 
Under this version of the doctrine, the trust arose out of necessity 
because Indian tribes and people were weak and defenseless. 
Indians as individuals became “wards” of the government because 
they were considered incompetent to manage their own personal 
affairs.146 The legal reasoning in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock is 
typical of many cases during this period.147 At issue in the case was 
an effort by the Cherokee Nation to prevent the Secretary of the 
Interior from leasing Cherokee lands for mineral exploitation 
without the Cherokees’ consent. Relying on two previous cases,148 
the Court found that the Indian tribes were “in a condition of 
pupilage or dependency, and subject to the paramount authority of 
the United States.”149 The Court further held that the 
administration of tribal property was within the exclusive authority 
of Congress: “the power being political and administrative in its 
nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the province 
of the legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the 
                                                 
144.  See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192.   
145.  See Judith Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political 
Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-
Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065 (2008).   
146.  For a recent article explaining the racist roots of this second 
version of the trust doctrine, see Nagle, Nothing to Trust, supra note 12.   
147.  187 U.S. 294 (1902). 
148.  Stephens, 174 U.S. 445; S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641. 
149.  187 U.S. at 305. 
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courts.”150 Perhaps this notion of the trust doctrine is closer to the 
doctrine’s ancient roots than Chief Justice Marshall’s version.151 In 
colonial times, the doctrine seemed to have been based on the 
notion of European superiority and the perceived duty of the 
colonizers to civilize and Christianize what were considered inferior 
people. According to one scholar, the main purpose of the trust 
doctrine in colonial times was to assimilate and take control of the 
property of the colonized.152 Some scholars have also argued that 
the historic trust doctrine is full of racist baggage that cannot be 
unloaded.153  
The major problem with relying on Mancari’s “rationally 
tied to the trust” test to fend off laws discriminating against Indians 
is that there is no judicially defined meaning for what constitutes 
Congress’s unique obligations towards Indians. While the Court has 
developed standards for breach of trust by the Executive Branch 
and has allowed tribes to bring lawsuits against the United States 
for money damages in the court of claims pursuant to the Tucker 
Act,154 these standards have never been applied to cases challenging 
the constitutionality of congressional legislation. Today, even 
scholars such as Professor Mary Wood, who have taken a 
conciliatory position towards the trust doctrine and advocate the 
continued use of a vigorous trust doctrine as a means to protect the 
reservations’ environment from deleterious federal policies and 
actions by federal officials, concede that the trust doctrine as a limit 
                                                 
150.  Id. at 308. 
151.  See discussion, supra, at notes 48-51.    
152.  See, e.g., Liam Seamus O’Melinn, The Imperial Origins of 
Federal Indian Law: The Ideology of Colonization in Britain, Ireland, and 
America, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1207 (1999). 
153.  For a version of this argument see ROBERT WILLIAMS, LIKE A 
LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL 
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).     
154.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1505 (2011); see United States v. Mitchell, 
463 U.S. 206 (1983), United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 
465 (2003); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); see also 
Judith N. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust 
Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral 
Resources, 71 N. D. L. Rev. 327, 329-34 (1995). 
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on the legislative branch may be a retreating mirage.155 Only one 
Supreme Court case has addressed a somewhat similar issue. In 
United States v. Sioux Nation,156 the Court held that because the 
taking of the Black Hills from the Sioux by the Federal government 
was not related to the trust obligations of the United States, the 
Sioux were owed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 
According to the Sioux Nation Court, “[t]he question whether a 
particular measure was appropriate for protecting and advancing 
the tribe’s interests, and therefore not subject to the constitutional 
command of the Just Compensation Clause, is factual in nature. 
The answer must be based on a consideration of all the evidence 
presented.”157 While the Sioux Nation principle may at first seem 
innocuous, scholars have criticized it.158 The problem here is that it 
is not the tribes themselves who make the decision that a law was 
enacted truly for their benefit; it is the courts. These courts may 
give great deference to what Congress thought it was doing when it 
enacted such legislation. In one aspect, Sioux Nation and Mancari 
follow a similar reasoning: In Mancari, the Court allowed Congress 
to disregard the racial aspect of laws treating Indians differently, 
but only if that legislation was tied to the trust responsibility, while 
in Sioux Nation, the Court would have allowed Congress to 
disregard the Just Compensation Clause, but only if it had acted 
pursuant to the trust doctrine. 
In retrospect, Sioux Nation was an easy case since it dealt 
with what was probably the most egregious abrogation of an Indian 
treaty by the United States.  Other cases may be more difficult to 
resolve because the trust power can be both too broad, and too 
narrow a qualification of congressional power. The over-breadth 
                                                 
155.  Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 49.   
156.  448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
157.  Id. at 415.    
158.  See Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth 
Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 
61 OR. L. REV. 245 (1982); Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take 
Property by Calling it a “Mere Change in the Form of Investment”, 38 TULSA 
L. REV. 37, at 38 (2002); see also Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian 
Affairs after Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235 (1982). 
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can be seen by asking whether a law prohibiting the sale of liquor to 
only tribal Indians would be upheld under the trust doctrine. 
Pointing out to studies demonstrating a higher rate of alcoholism 
among tribal members, it is not unimaginable to think that some 
judges may find the law rationally related to the protection of 
Indians under the trust doctrine. On the other hand, the trust 
doctrine could be used to impose overly narrow restrictions on 
Congress. Nothing in the words of the Indian Commerce Clause 
mandates that Congress only enact legislation benefitting Indians 
pursuant to the trust. Congress can act at times as a trustee and at 
others as a regulator.159 So, unless one adopts an exceedingly broad 
definition of the trust responsibility, many acts of Congress, which 
are not enacted for the benefit of Indians but for the purpose of 
regulating them, would ostensibly fail the Mancari test.       
 The second problem with reliance on the trust doctrine is 
that while the doctrine has been used to constrain the power of the 
Executive Branch,160 it has been used in the past mostly to expand 
the power of the Legislative Branch.161 As Dean Nell Newton once 
stated, the trust doctrine is “not constitutionally based and thus not 
enforceable against Congress.”162 The likelihood that the Court will 
start using the trust doctrine to control the power of Congress is, to 
say the least, remote. So far, it seems that only one court seriously 
undertook the review of legislation to see if it was enacted in 
violation of the Indian Trust Doctrine and, not surprisingly, found 
that it was not.163   
                                                 
159.  See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative 
Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 253, 265-69 (2010). 
160.  See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of 
Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal 
Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109 (1995). 
161.   Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (holding that because of the trust 
doctrine Congress had the power to enact the Major Crimes Act even though 
it exceeded its power under the Indian Commerce Clause).       
162.  Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, 
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195, 232-33 (1984). 
163.  See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. 
Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 
1988 was enacted in conformance with the Trust even though the Tribe argued 
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  Some scholars favoring continued use of the trust doctrine, 
such as Reid Chambers, take the position that the major problem 
with the trust doctrine is that it has been misunderstood. Properly 
conceived, the trust doctrine should be viewed primarily as a 
doctrine to protect and encourage tribal self-government.164 
Unfortunately, a recent Supreme Court case, United States v. 
Jicarilla Apache Nation,165 seems to indicate that at least the 
majority of the Supreme Court is stuck on the Kagama version of 
the doctrine. In Jicarilla Apache, the Tribe brought a breach of 
trust case against the United States, claiming mismanagement of 
tribal funds held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the 
Tribe. In order to make their case, the tribal attorneys wanted 
access to certain documents that the United States claimed were 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Tribe argued that 
the privilege was not available because of the “fiduciary exception.” 
Under that exception, the attorney-client privilege does not prevent 
the beneficiary of a trust from having access to communications 
between the trustee and its lawyers concerning management of the 
trust funds.    
The Supreme Court held that the common law “fiduciary” 
exception was not available to Indian tribes trying to get documents 
from the United States. The Court determined that the fiduciary 
exception is a common law exception applicable to private trustees. 
However, the United States was not analogous to a private trustee 
because, while the duties of a private trustee are defined by the 
common law, the duties of the United States as trustee for the 
tribes are uniquely defined by federal statutes.166 In addition, the 
trust function the United States performed was a sovereign function 
subject to the plenary power of Congress, and Congress has 
                                                                                                             
that it infringed on its sovereignty and right of self-government).   
164.  Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust 
Responsibility with Self Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on 
Development of the Federal Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. Paper No. 13A (2005). 
165.  131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).   
166.  Id. at 2323. 
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structured that function to pursue its own policy goals.167 In other 
words, according to the Court, Congress looks mostly at its own 
sovereign interests and not the tribes when enacting statutes 
pursuant to the trust relationship.   
Justice Alito’s Opinion for the Court is at odds with several 
previous notions about the trust doctrine. The most important is the 
role of the common law of trust in defining the United States trust 
obligations towards the tribes.168 According to Justice Alito, the 
United States trust obligations are solely derived from statutes and 
not federal common law. The previous common scholarly 
understanding maintained that the trust responsibility the United 
States has towards Indian nations flowed primarily from three 
sources. First, the hundreds of treaties signed between the tribes 
and the United States.169 Second, the huge amount of lands the 
United States acquired from the tribes in those treaties or 
otherwise.170 Third, that the Doctrine of Discovery, under which the 
territory of the Indian tribes was incorporated into the geographical 
limits of the United States, transformed tribal ownership of these 
lands into a right of occupancy to live on lands over which the 
United States had ultimate dominion.171 Although the Court still 
stated that it did “not question the undisputed existence of a 
general trust relationship,”172 that relationship seems to now be 
                                                 
167.  Id. at 2324. 
168.  See United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 123 S. Ct. 
1126, 1133 (2003). Finding that the existence of trust duties on behalf of the 
United States was confirmed because “This is so because elementary trust law, 
after all, confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary actually 
administering trust property may not allow it to fall into ruin on his watch. 
One of the fundamental common-law duties of a trustee is to preserve and 
maintain trust assets.” Id. at 1133 (internal citations omitted). 
169.  See Nagle, Nothing to Trust, supra note 12, at 67-68. 
170.  See Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 49. 
171.  See Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered, supra 
note 50, at 166 (stating, “[t]he trust doctrine plainly had its genesis in the 
Discovery doctrine . . . This thinking came largely from the Eurocentric ideas 
of Discovery and the notion that uncivilized, infidel savages needed to be 
saved by Euro-Americans.” Id.). 
172.  Id. 
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next to meaningless since the tribes can no longer invoke common 
law trust standards unless Congress specifically calls for them. The 
decision raises, therefore, some profound questions concerning the 
utility of the doctrine from a tribal perspective.   
  One could search for a silver lining in the decision by 
arguing that if the general trust relationship can no longer be used 
by the tribes to impose additional duties on the United States, the 
existence of a general trust should no longer be used by the Court 
to boost Congressional power over Indian tribes beyond the power 
to regulate Commerce with the tribes. However, the general tone of 
the Jicarilla Apache opinion seems to indicate that the majority of 
the Court believes that the main purpose of the trust doctrine still is 
to give Congress plenary authority over Indian tribes. The Jicarilla 
Apache Opinion reads as if it were written during the heart of the 
Allotment era, between the Court’s decisions in Kagama and 
Lonewolf. 
 It is for this reason that this article takes the position that 
Indians should not view the trust doctrine as a source to control or 
regulate congressional power, even if it is for the purpose of 
supporting the legitimacy of laws favoring Indians, unless the trust 
duties can be tied to promises made in treaties. In other words, the 
only extra-constitutional sources of congressional power over 
Indian Affairs are the numerous treaties signed with the Indian 
tribes. The only general duty imposed on the United States in those 
treaties is to guarantee the survival of Indian tribes as self-
governing entities with sovereignty over their lands and 
territories.173 Therefore, the sole role of the trust doctrine in 
boosting congressional power beyond its Indian Commerce Clause 
power should be to legitimize any legislation enacted to protect the 
tribes’ right to tribal territories and self-government. Otherwise, 
congressional power should be limited to the text of the Indian 
Commerce Clause as previously explained.174 
While I would have nothing against using the Mancari 
                                                 
173.  See Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 49, at 
1496-97. This does not mean that the United States does not have specific trust 
duties resting on specific treaty clauses, or statutes.   
174.  See supra notes 135-43.  
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“related to the trust” standard if there were a consensus that laws 
enacted pursuant to the trust have to support tribal self-
government, the recent Supreme Court decision in Jicarilla reveals 
a different understanding of the trust doctrine. So, for instance, 
many of these secretarial approval requirements relating to the 
management and lease of Indian land would pass muster under the 
Jicarilla version of the trust doctrine. 
In conclusion, challenging statutes based on the fact that 
they treat Indians differently and are not rationally tied to the trust 
is an uphill battle with limited possibilities. In the next Part, 
however, I discuss whether restrictions on the tribes’ right to 
manage their own lands may amount to a denial of equal 
protection. 
III. FROM MANCARI  TO WINDSOR: USING A RATIONAL 
BASIS WITH BITE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS TO 
CHALLENGE FEDERAL INDIAN LAWS ON EQUAL 
PROTECTION GROUNDS  
   In this Part, I argue that federal statutes which restrict tribal 
self-government, such as those mandating secretarial approval of 
tribal land management decisions, can be successfully challenged on 
equal protection grounds using either an “unconstitutional animus” 
test,175 or a version of the rational basis test at times called “rational 
basis with bite.” 176  
    As the Court put it, “[u]nder traditional equal protection 
analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained, if the 
classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.”177 However, under the established tiered approach to 
equal protection, laws involving a suspect class such as race or 
                                                 
175.  See Pollvogt, supra note 35. 
176.  See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Supreme Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972); see also Gayle 
L. Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any 
Other Name, 62, IND. L. J. 779 (1987).  
177.  Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533. 
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alienage are reviewed under strict scrutiny where the law has to be 
necessary or narrowly tailored to protect a compelling 
governmental interest.178 Finally, laws involving a quasi-suspect 
class, such as gender or illegitimacy, are analyzed under 
intermediate scrutiny, which requires the classification to be 
substantially related to an important governmental interest.179 The 
criteria for a suspect or quasi-suspect classification developed by 
the Supreme Court are (1) an immutable characteristic, such as race 
or gender, which is (2) irrelevant to the legitimate governmental 
goal, and which has (3) been historically used to the disadvantage of 
a group that is (4) relatively politically powerless to defend itself.  
  While Native Americans easily qualify as a suspect class 
under these criteria, classifications referring only to members of 
Indian tribes and not to Native Americans generally may not fit the 
first criterion, as it is generally understood that Indians can 
relinquish their tribal membership. While tribal members generally 
fit the third criterion, they may not fit the second, since 
membership in a tribe may be relevant to a legitimate governmental 
goal. As many have noted, however, even when dealing with a non-
suspect class, the Supreme Court at times seems to be using a more 
aggressive form of scrutiny than the regular rational basis review, 
even though it has never acknowledged that fact.180 Specifically, 
scholars claim that in a group of cases, the most important of which 
are Moreno,181 Cleburne,182 Romer v. Evans,183 and Windsor,184 the 
                                                 
178.  Although that standard was first used in Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), its source is the famous footnote 4 in United States 
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), which stated “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily relied 
upon to protect minorities,” and therefore “may call for correspondingly more 
searching inquiry.” Id.    
179.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (where, for the first 
time, a majority of the Justices held that intermediate scrutiny was the proper 
level of review for classifications based on gender). 
180.  See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-
Basis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281 (2011).   
181.  Moreno, 413 U.S. 528. 
182.  Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432. 
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Court has claimed to use rational basis review while in effect 
performing a more searching inquiry.      
A. The Case Law Showing Either a “Rational Basis with Bite” 
Standard of Review and/or “Unconstitutional Animus” 
  In Moreno, a class action was brought challenging a 
provision of the Food Stamp Act providing that any household 
containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the 
household was no longer eligible for food stamps. The Court, 
purporting to use regular rational basis review, held that the 
classification (distinguishing between certain kinds of households 
when it came to eligibility) was not rationally related to the stated 
purpose of the legislation, which was to minimize fraud and 
maintain adequate nutrition while stimulating the agricultural 
economy. After scrutinizing the legislative history and finding that 
the different treatment was driven by the desire to prevent 
“hippies” and “hippie communes” from participating in the food 
stamp program, the Court famously declared “if the constitutional 
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must 
at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.”185 Answering the government’s argument 
that the provision was nevertheless rationally related to prohibiting 
fraud, the Court found that other sections of the Act specifically 
addressed the fraud issue and did it more effectively.186 
  In Cleburne, a group home for mentally disabled people 
challenged a zoning ordinance excluding such group homes from 
certain zoning districts. The Court held that even though the 
mentally disabled did not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, 
the zoning ordinance denied the group home the equal protection 
of the laws in that the exclusion from some districts was not 
rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. After 
                                                                                                             
183.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
184.  133 S. Ct. 2675. 
185.  Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. 
186.  Id. at 536. 
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stating that the State “may not rely on a classification whose 
relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary or irrational,”187 the Court concluded that “the 
record [did] not reveal any rational basis for believing that the 
[group] home would pose any special threat to the city’s legitimate 
interests.”188 The Court examined closely the reasons given by the 
City for the exclusion of such group homes and stated “mere 
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are 
properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible 
basis for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from 
apartment houses.”189 The Court concluded “the short of it is that 
requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an 
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”190        
  In Romer v. Evans, Colorado voters adopted, via statewide 
referendum, an amendment to the State Constitution prohibiting 
any governmental actions designed to protect the status of persons 
based on their “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, 
conduct, practices or relationships.”191 Rejecting the State’s 
principal argument that the amendment simply placed gays and 
lesbians in the same position as others, the Court held that the 
amendment went far beyond depriving homosexuals of special 
rights but imposed upon them, and them alone, the burden of 
seeking specific legal protection for injuries caused by 
discrimination.192 The Court first remarked that “[e]ven in the 
ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of 
standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the 
classification adopted and the object to be attained.”193 The Court 
also observed that the amendment “identifies persons by a single 
trait and then denies them protection across the board,”194 by 
                                                 
187.  Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. 
188.  Id. at 448. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. at 450. 
191.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.  
192.  Id. at 632. 
193.  Id. 
194.  Id. at 633. 
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denying them the right to seek specific legislative protections. 
According to the Court, that type of denial was unprecedented, and 
therefore “discrimination of an unusual character especially 
suggests careful consideration to determine whether they are 
obnoxious to the constitutional provision.”195 Finally, after stating 
that the “laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable 
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity 
towards the class of persons affected,” the Court concluded that the 
amendment “classifie[d] homosexuals not to further a proper 
legislative end but to make them unequal to anyone else. This 
Colorado cannot do.”196     
Finally, in Windsor, relying mostly on Romer, Moreno, and 
Lawrence v. Texas,197 the Court struck down the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) on equal protection grounds. After 
finding that the right to marry was an important right and that the 
State decision to recognize and validate marriages between same-
sex couples “conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense 
import,”198 the Court stated that “[t]he avowed purpose and 
practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a 
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter 
into same-sex marriages.”199 Having analyzed the legislative history 
of DOMA, the Court found that interference with the equal dignity 
of same-sex marriages was the very “essence” and purpose of 
DOMA.200 Therefore, DOMA violated “basic due process and 
equal protection principles,”201 because “a bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify 
disparate treatment of that group.”202   
                                                 
195.  Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 
322, 337-38 (1928)). 
196.  Id. at 634-35. 
197.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
198.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
199.  Id. at 2693. 
200.  Id. 
201. Id. 
202.  Id. Although Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, spent a 
considerable part of the opinion on the fact that regulations of domestic 
relation is a traditional functions of the state governments, it is hard to 
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“The decision,” as one scholar put it, “is peripatetic. It 
heads down a path toward federalism, but suddenly veers off in the 
direction of ‘liberty,’ looking back over its shoulder towards states’ 
authority. Then it pivots toward equal protection, with darts toward 
dignity, before finally settling on animus as a destination. When we 
arrive . . . we may ask ourselves, ‘Well, how did [we] get here?’”203 
No wonder some see the decision as an equal protection case 
involving a heightened version of rational basis review,204 while 
others see it as a liberty and fundamental right case,205 and still 
others as being based on the anti-animus doctrine.206 
B. The Four Cases as Representing Unconstitutional Animus 
Some scholars have identified these four cases and others 
like them as establishing the principle that anytime the 
classification is driven by “unconstitutional animus,” the law is 
automatically a denial of equal protection.207 In other words, once 
“unconstitutional animus” is identified there is no reason to 
perform either rational basis or rational basis with bite review. The 
two major questions relating to animus is first defining what it is, 
and secondly determining what evidence can be used and is needed 
to establish the presence of animus.  
In an insightful article written before Windsor, after first 
establishing that many rational basis with bite cases are better 
explained as “animus” cases, Professor Pollvogt defined animus as 
“a type of impermissible objective function. Specifically, animus is 
                                                                                                             
determine how important a role federalism concerns played in the decision 
since the Court also stated “[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether this federal 
intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts 
the federal balance.” Id. at 2692. 
203.  Carpenter, supra, note 35 at 192-93.  
204.  See Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court can Strike Down Marriage 
Restrictions Under Traditional Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 331 (2013). 
205.  See Douglas Nejaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE 
L.J. 219 (2013). 
206.  See Carpenter, supra note 35, at 225. 
207.  See Pollvogt, supra note 35; Carpenter, supra note 35. 
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present where the public laws are harnessed to create and enforce 
distinctions between social groups—that is, groups of persons 
identified by status rather than conduct.”208 In a post Windsor 
article, Professor Dale Carpenter provided his own definition of 
animus:  
 
The government acts on animus when, to a material 
degree, it aims “to disparage and to injure” a person 
or group of people. The injury may be tangible, as in 
the denial of benefits and protections a group would 
have in the absence of animus against them. Or the 
injury may be intangible, as in the affront to their 
dignity and the respect they deserve as equal 
citizens.209    
 
 After stating that, “[i]n animus cases, the impermissible 
purpose is the purpose to inflict injury or indignity,”210 Professor 
Carpenter argued that such purpose does not have to be the sole or 
even the dominant purpose, but need only be a “‘motivating factor 
in the decision’ to support the conclusion that the act is 
unconstitutional.”211 After stating that such a “motivating factor can 
be inferred from such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent 
as may be available,” Professor Carpenter set out the evidence 
needed to establish animus.  For indirect or circumstantial evidence 
needed to raise such an inference, Professor Carpenter listed 
factors such as the impact of the decision, the historical 
background, the specific sequences of events leading to the 
decision, and whether there was departure from normal procedures 
in making the decision or departure from substantial considerations 
that would normally drive the result.212 As for direct evidence, 
                                                 
208.  Pollvogt, supra note 35, at 926. 
209.  Carpenter, supra note 35, at 186 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2696) (emphasis in original). 
210.  Id. at 243. 
211.  Id. at 244 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).   
212.  Id. at 245.  
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Professor Carpenter enumerates five factors as establishing direct 
evidence that animus was a “material influence” in the passage of 
the statute: (1) statutory text, (2) political and legal context, (3) 
legislative proceedings, (4) real world impact or effect, and (5) the 
utter failure of alternative explanations for the legislation. 
Importantly, Carpenter notes that “[t]he Court’s animus cases show 
that no single one of these factors must be present in order to make 
the inference” of improper animus.213  
Professor Pollvogt agrees that unconstitutional animus can 
be established by direct evidence of bias in the legislative record 
but also argues that an “inference of animus” can be  “based on the 
structure of the law.”214 Discussing Cleburne as a prime example of 
animus based on the structure of the law, Pollvogt posits that the 
Court performed a “micro” suspect classification analysis not for 
the purpose of establishing a suspect or quasi-suspect class but 
rather to examine “the validity of the classification in light of the 
interests at stake in that particular case.”215  
Evaluating which Federal Indian law statutes were enacted 
with animus as a motivating factor is beyond the scope of this 
article. Further, not all the statutes mandating federal approval 
concerning land management decisions were enacted with animus 
towards Indians. However, many such statues were doubtlessly 
enacted out of prejudice and bias towards Native Americans.  
Claims that Indian tribes and their members were in need of 
federal supervision because they were not sophisticated enough to 
manage their own affairs, or were incompetent and inferior, should 
no longer be considered valid legislative purposes. A search of the 
legislative history should produce evidence on which laws were 
enacted with these stereotypes in mind. As the Court stated in 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, “[c]are must be taken 
in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic 
and stereotypical notions. Thus if the statutory objective is to 
exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender because they are 
                                                 
213.  Id. at 245-46. 
214.  Pollvogt, supra at note 35, at 926-27. 
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presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately 
inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.”216 Although Hogan 
dealt with gender classifications, a quasi-suspect class, the same 
reasoning should follow in evaluating whether laws imposing 
restrictions on Indian tribes and their members were enacted with 
these biases in mind.      
C. The Four Cases as Creating a Rational Basis with Bite Standard 
As stated previously, the four cases can be interpreted as 
creating a higher level of rational basis review. There are two major 
questions concerning implementation of the review with bite 
standard. First, how different is this form of judicial review from the 
regular rational basis review? Secondly, what groups should be 
covered by this more intensive form of judicial review? In other 
words, what are the characteristics a group has to possess in order 
to qualify for this form of judicial review?    
1. How is Rational Basis with Bite Different than Regular 
Rational Basis Review? 
 Regular rational basis review requires courts to perform 
essentially three tasks. First, the reviewing court has to determine 
that the group being classified or discriminated against is similarly 
situated with others not included in the classification. Second, it has 
to determine that the governmental purpose is legitimate. Finally 
the court has to determine that the classification is rationally 
related to accomplishing the purpose. The first basic difference 
between regular rational basis review and review with bite is in 
determining the purpose. In regular review, courts will come up 
with almost any purpose they can think of that will suit or fit the 
classification. Courts do not try to determine what purposes the 
legislature actually had in mind when it enacted the statute. In 
review with bite, the exact opposite happens. Courts will sift 
through the legislative record to find the true motives of the 
legislature. This was very evident in Moreno and Windsor where 
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the Court found animus towards hippies and homosexuals, 
respectively.217 It was harder to determine in Romer since the law 
was the product of a referendum and therefore lacked a legislative 
record.218 However, the unusualness of the law in that case raised 
an inference that the purpose was indeed inappropriate.       
  A second basic difference between the two levels of review 
is in questioning the legitimacy of purported governmental 
interests. While the Court has not devised a test for determining 
what constitutes an improper purpose, the four cases analyzed 
above reveal that treating a group differently because of irrational 
fear or prejudice, as well as a mere desire to harm politically 
unpopular groups or vulnerable minorities, can never justify 
legislation putting such groups at a disadvantage to everyone else.   
Finally, a third difference is that once the real purpose has 
been established, courts using the review with bite approach will 
look at all the evidence available in the record to determine if the 
mean chosen (treating the group differently) is in fact rationally 
related to achieving the purpose of the legislation. In other words, 
the approach not only puts the burden on the state to produce 
evidence justifying the classification, but also looks more closely at 
whether the mean chosen is adequately tailored to achieving the 
purpose. In regular rational basis review, courts usually assume that 
there is a correlation between the classification and the purpose, or 
at least that the legislature could have rationally believed that such 
correlation existed. This assumption is not made in review with bite 
analysis. 
2. Should Tribal Members and Indian Tribes Be Included Among 
Groups Qualifying for Rational Basis With Bite Review? 
 Since the Court has never acknowledged the use of rational 
basis with bite, it has of course not described how to determine 
what groups or situations would trigger such approach. After 
looking for similarities among the groups who have benefitted from 
such review, one scholar wondered if heightened review could be 
                                                 
217.  See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.  
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triggered every time the Court dealt with the denial of significant 
governmental benefits. Discounting such possibility and finding no 
common bonds among the groups, that scholar concluded that, 
“[t]here does not seem to be any consistent principle that explains 
why the U.S. Supreme Court chooses one version of rationality in 
one case but not in another with a very similar factual setting.”219 
Others have also attempted to find a common strain among the 
cases. Finding that, “Lawrence mandates heightened protection for 
autonomy interests central to personhood while Moreno and its 
progeny requires judicial sensitivity to regulations that burden 
vulnerable minorities.” One commentator concluded that “[w]hen a 
statute impinges crucial personal autonomy interests or targets a 
group on the basis of mere animus,”220 rational basis with bite 
applies. In this article, I suggest that the case law reflects that 
rational basis with bite is appropriate every time a disfavored group 
lacking political clout makes an equal protection claim involving 
the denial of important, albeit not fundamental, liberty interests.221 
In other words, rational basis with bite is applicable anytime the 
legislation is aimed at a vulnerable or unpopular minority and 
restricts an important liberty interest.  
An example of a case with similar arguments as the four 
analyzed above is Plyler v. Doe,222 where the Court reviewed a 
Texas law preventing undocumented children from getting the free 
education available to other children under what seemed a 
                                                 
219.  Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational Basis Review 
and Same-Sex Relationship, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 305-06 (2011); see also 
Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court 
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 373-82 
(1999) (discounting the viability of rational basis with bite as a standalone 
form of judicial review). 
220.  Austin Raynor, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order 
Rational Basis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1075 (2013). 
221.  See, e.g., David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of 
Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 51 
(2013) (arguing that restrictions on the freedom to contract when imposed 
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somewhat heightened form of review. While undocumented status 
was not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and the right to a free 
education was not considered a fundamental right, the Court struck 
down the law even though the classification seemed to have been 
rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of 
preserving scarce financial resources.223 In other words, one 
possible explanation for the result is that it is the combination of 
denying an important benefit (education) to a vulnerable minority 
(undocumented children) that generated a higher level of scrutiny. 
Examples of a combination of rights raising the level of judicial 
review can be found in other areas of constitutional law. According 
to Justice Scalia, this combination of rights explained the Court’s 
invalidation of laws of general applicability under the Free Exercise 
Clause.224 In Employment Division v. Smith, holding that the Free 
Exercise Clause alone was not available as a defense against a 
criminal law of general applicability, he stated, “[t]he only decisions 
in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application 
of neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action 
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.”225 
Drawing an analogy with laws discriminating against tribes by 
restricting their right to solely manage their land and natural 
resources, one could argue that Indian tribes, like undocumented 
children, are a vulnerable minority and that the right to contract, 
while no longer a fundamental right,226 is still an important right as 
reflected by the inclusion of the Contract Clause in the United 
States Constitution.227   
In conclusion, for the following reasons, this article takes 
the position that rational basis with bite should apply to federal 
                                                 
223.  See Id. at 249-51 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).  
224.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 881 (1990).  
225.   Id. 
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laws and regulations burdening the tribes’ management of their 
land and natural resources. First, even though as described 
previously the classification is not a racial one, there is no doubt 
that the classification, tribes and their members, involves a 
vulnerable group lacking political power. Secondly, while managing 
one’s own land does not involve the same kind of autonomy 
interest that was at stake in Lawrence, an argument can be made 
that important economic liberties are involved when making crucial 
managerial decisions concerning one’s own lands.228 As stated by 
one scholar, “[t]he argument that these restrictions exist for the 
benefit of the American Indians is not dissimilar from earlier 
arguments regarding the faculties of blacks, slaves, or women. As 
with gender, race, and servitude, the law has partially restricted a 
fundamental right to contract based on an involuntary characteristic 
of a group who has suffered substantial discrimination.”229   
D. Making the Case for Denial of Equal Protection 
  Once the rational basis with bite test is found applicable, the 
case still has to be made that these land management regulations 
amount to a denial of equal protection. Two obstacles have to be 
overcome: First, the Indians have to show that they are similarly 
situated with other individuals or groups not subject to the 
restriction. Secondly, they have to demonstrate that the actual 
purpose of the law is inappropriate or that the substance of the 
regulation is not rationally tied to that purpose. 
1. Overcoming the “Not Similarly Situated” Argument 
  As the Court stated in Cleburne, the Equal Protection 
Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike.”230 The “similarly situated” concept is not 
                                                 
228.  A similar argument concerning all restrictions on economic 
freedoms was made in Raynor, Economic Liberty, supra note 220.  
229.  Weber, supra note 221, at 80. 
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new; it has been around since 1885.231 It was used successfully to 
deny equal protection to women before the advent of intermediate 
scrutiny and the classification of gender as a quasi- suspect class.232 
Currently, it is used by anti-marriage equality advocates to argue 
that homosexual couples are not similarly situated to heterosexual 
couples.233 Perhaps the more important debate surrounding the 
“similarly situated” doctrine concerns whether this determination 
should be a threshold inquiry or be included as part of an 
integrated approach.234 As argued by one scholar advocating the 
integrated approach,  
 
In cases regarding express categories, no matter the 
level of equal protection applied, the focus of the 
“similarly situated” analysis is substantially the same 
as the key inquiry of equal protection review.  Does 
the legislative classification bear a close enough 
relationship to the purpose of the statute . . . the 
analysis, properly understood, is another way of 
describing the substantive equal protection 
inquiry.235  
 
Courts have questioned the ‘similarly situated’ doctrine 
arguing that if part of the threshold inquiry required plaintiffs to 
bear the burden of finding others with the same classifying trait as 
them, but not part of the class being discriminated against, that 
burden would never be met.236 The same-sex marriage cases 
provide a good example of how circular the similarly situated 
requirement can become. If the law discriminates against all same-
sex couples and the argument is that heterosexual couples are not 
similarly situated to heterosexual ones, the same-sex advocates 
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have lost the battle before it has started. This is why most courts 
have stated that the central inquiry is not whether all these couples 
are similarly situated to each other, but whether they are similarly 
situated when it comes to the purpose of the law.237   
  When it comes to challenging federal statutes imposing 
restrictions on tribally owned land, how one describes the purpose 
of the statute could be crucial in establishing the similarly situated 
requirement. This is why applying rational basis with bite is very 
important to such cases. That is because under such more intense 
review, courts will look for the real purpose behind the 
classification. For instance, if the purpose of the legislation is to 
protect “all tribes with land held in trust,” or “protecting the tribal 
land base,” as the Federal government will no doubt argue, one 
could probably successfully assert that there is no one else similarly 
situated since no one else owns land in trust. That would be an 
example of a circular argument similar to the argument being made 
by the anti-marriage equality advocates. On the other hand, if one 
can argue that the purpose of the statute is protecting certain 
people or entities owning land from predators or poor decision-
making, the universe of similarly situated people expands 
dramatically.  
One argument sure to be made by federal officials is that 
Indian tribes are not similarly situated to anyone else because the 
United States has a general trust relationship with the Indian tribes. 
In addition, the United States holds over 56 million acres of Indian 
land in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes and their members.238 In 
other words, it is the United States that has the trust or legal title to 
the land while the Indians only have the beneficial title to such 
lands. As explained later, the existence of a “general” trust 
relationship should be irrelevant unless the trustee can be held 
financially liable for breaching its duties under that relationship.239 
                                                 
237.  Id. at 435 n.54.  
238.  See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Performance and Accountability 
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Concerning the fact that the United States has trust title to tribal 
land, it is true that language in many cases indicates that since the 
United States owns the legal or trust title to all Indian lands, it 
naturally has plenary power to manage such lands.240 While it is 
generally accepted that over 56 million acres of Indian land is 
owned in trust by the United States for the benefit of Indian tribes 
and individual tribal members, scholars have recently begun to 
challenge this general assumption.241 According to these scholars, 
there are only two legitimate sources giving trust title for the 
United States.242 They are first, the statutes specifying that land was 
being taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of 
Indians. Statutes such as the General Allotment Act,243 the Indian 
Reorganization Act,244 and other tribal specific legislation, contain 
such authorizations. Secondly, some of the treaties signed with 
specific tribes may contain such trust language. The overwhelming 
majority of treaties, however, do not provide for treaty lands to be 
held in trust.245 The Indian Land Tenure Foundation has estimated 
that 15.7 million acres of allotted land remained in trust as of 1934, 
and that another 6.7 million acres have been taken into trust under 
section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act since 1934.246 This is 
about 34 million acres short of the 56 million claimed to be held in 
trust by the United States. Most of these 34 million acres are tribal 
treaty land and became seen as being held into trust just because at 
some undesignated point during the 20th Century, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs by administrative fiat began to treat these lands as if 
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they were held in trust. I agree with scholars such as Robert Coulter 
who have argued that the United States should not be considered as 
holding trust title to these lands.247 
Robert Coulter argued that the only possible non statutory 
or non-treaty sources for such legal title are the Doctrine of 
Discovery, the general trust relationship, and the notion that 
because Indians are incompetent, they should be considered the 
wards of the federal government;248 in other words, doctrines of 
federal common law. Coulter dismissed them all as illegitimate 
sources of trust title.249 Needless to say, federal common law should 
no longer be based on racist notions treating Indians as 
incompetent wards in order to justify trust title in the United States 
as was done in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.250 Furthermore, the 
existence of a general trust relationship is not a valid legal reason to 
vest trust “title” in the United States. Although this does not mean 
that the United States does not have a general duty to protect these 
lands from being taken from the tribes, implying from this limited 
duty a general plenary authority to manage and control such lands 
is wrong. This leaves the Doctrine of Discovery as the only possible 
reason for holding land into trust. Under the doctrine, the 
discovering colonial power was considered to have the exclusive 
right to acquire lands in the discovered country from the aboriginal 
people living there.251 This exclusivity has also been called a right of 
preemption.252 However, in Johnson v. M’Intosh,253 Justice Marshall 
modified or Americanized the doctrine when he held that under the 
doctrine, once discovered by a European power, the Indian tribes’ 
right or title to their territory was transformed into a “right of 
occupancy” and, “their power to dispose of the soil at their own 
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original 
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those 
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who made it.”254  
      The European nations were not in agreement concerning 
the exact ramifications of the Doctrine of Discovery when it came 
to its effect on the rights of the Indians.255 As argued by Professor 
Robert Williams, the European nations only agreed that the 
Doctrine of Discovery vested in the discoverer “an exclusive or 
‘preemptive’ entitlement to deal with the natives as against other 
Europeans crowns.”256 It seems that no other nation took the 
position that the discovering nation immediately acquired full title 
to Indian land.257 In a recent article, Professor Michael Blumm has 
argued that Johnson v. M’Intosh really stands for the proposition 
that the Indians had fee title to their land subject to a restriction 
against alienation and that “[c]onsequently, Marshall’s references 
to ‘exclusive title’ and ‘absolute title’ must have meant sovereignty . 
. . [s]imilarly, references to ‘ultimate title’ and ‘seisin’ in his opinion 
had to do with sovereign authority, not proprietorship.”258 
Whatever the true intent of Justice Marshall in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, federal common law can and has evolved. To still hang 
on to the colonial Doctrine of Discovery with all its racist baggage 
and argue that the federal government today has ultimate, 
exclusive, or absolute title to Indian land is profoundly wrong, at 
least from a moral standpoint. For instance, some 125 years after 
Johnson v. M’Intosh Chief Justice Marshall’s understanding of the 
doctrine was relied upon by the Court to hold that the Indian Right 
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of Occupancy amounted to a non-vested property right and 
therefore, aboriginal Indian lands held under such title could be 
taken by the United States without having to give the Indians fair 
compensation as mandated under the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution.259 By today’s standards, there is something not quite 
right with this result.260   
2. Arguing the Real (or Improper) Governmental Purpose 
  Rational basis with bite allows courts to investigate the real 
purpose behind a law. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to investigate the real motivations that have guided Congress 
throughout history to impose federal restrictions on tribal land 
management decisions, one thing is for sure: the real purpose is not 
always the claimed purpose. Claims that Congress always acts out 
of compassion towards the Indians or is, as a good trustee, always 
looking out for the best interest of the tribes are unfounded, at least 
most of the time. In this respect, United States v. Sioux Nation is 
relevant.261 This case upheld the Sioux Nation’s claim that when the 
United States unilaterally abrogated many of the treaties made with 
the Sioux and took the Black Hills,262 Congress had not been acting 
as a trustee, but more as a conqueror pursuant to its power of 
eminent domain. Therefore, the Just Compensation Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment was applicable and the federal government was 
liable to the Sioux Nation for the taking of this vested property 
right.263 In the process of deciding the case, the Court quoted with 
approval the following from an older case:  
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It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneously 
(1) act as trustee for the benefit of the Indians, 
exercising its plenary power over the Indians and 
their property, as it thinks is in their best interests, 
and (2) exercise its sovereign power of eminent 
domain, taking the Indians property . . . In any given 
situation in which Congress has acted with regard to 
Indian people, it must have acted in one capacity or 
the other. Congress can own two hats, but it cannot 
wear them both at the same time.264  
 
In proceeding to determine which hat Congress was wearing 
when it abrogated the Sioux Treaty and took the Black Hills, the 
Sioux Nation Court held that courts no longer could presume that 
Congress always acted for the benefit of the Indians pursuant to its 
role as trustee. Therefore, the Court stated that it was now 
requiring “courts, in considering whether a particular congressional 
action was taken in pursuance to Congress’s power to manage and 
control tribal lands for the Indians’ welfare, to engage in a 
thoroughgoing and impartial examination of the historical 
record.”265  
In making this inquiry, another Supreme Court case, United 
States v. Navajo Nation,266 is instructive. This case involved a claim 
for breach of trust by the Navajo Nation against the United States. 
Although involving a series of extensive and complicated facts, the 
Navajo Nation’s case boiled down to a claim that the Secretary of 
the Interior should not have approved a mining lease between the 
Navajo Nation and the Peabody Coal Corporation.267 The Navajo 
Nation claimed that the Secretary of the Interior concealed key 
information, putting it at a major disadvantage in the ensuing lease 
negotiations with Peabody Coal.268 The Navajo Nation sued the 
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United States for breach of fiduciary duties, arguing that a 
reasonable trustee would not have approved the lease because it 
was detrimental to the interests of the Navajo Nation.269 The 
Supreme Court denied the claim holding that when Secretary 
Hodel approved the lease pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act of 1938 (“IMLA”),270 he was not in breach of any specific 
statutory trust duty. Under previous decisions, in order to make a 
credible claim for money damages under the Indian Tucker Act,271 
the Navajo Nation had to find a source of substantive law that “can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government for the damage sustained.”272 However, in this case, 
besides the lease approval requirement, IMLA did not assign any 
managerial duties to the Secretary over coal leasing.273 As the Court 
put it, the Act did not even create a limited or bare trust 
relationship as IMLA contained no trust language whatsoever 
obligating the Secretary to act as a trustee for the benefit of the 
tribe. Implicit in this holding is that the Secretary was not, in effect, 
acting as a trustee for the tribe when he approved the lease.274 The 
case is meaningful because it tells us that the lease approval statute, 
imposing on the Navajo Nation and other Indian tribes, a 
Secretarial approval requirement not mandated on any other owner 
of mineral resources was not enacted solely, if at all, for the benefit 
of the tribes. 
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In the scenario presented in Navajo Nation, there are two 
arguments that could be made that the lease approval requirement 
was a denial of equal protection. The first one is that since the 
requirement of federal approval for all Navajo leases was not 
enacted uniquely for the benefit of the Indians pursuant to the trust 
relationship, under the Mancari standard, that discrimination or 
different treatment cannot possibly be rationally tied to Congress’s 
unique obligations towards the Indians. As such, the classification is 
a violation of the Navajo Nation’s right to equal protection under 
the laws. Claiming that Congress delegated that authority to the 
Secretary pursuant to the general trust relationship is a 
smokescreen that should be rejected. It is true that in United States 
v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,275 the Court held that Congress could 
not be compared to a regular common law trustee because, in 
administering its trust responsibility towards Indians, it found that 
“the Government had established the trust relationship in order to 
impose its own policy on Indian lands . . .  [i]n this way, Congress 
has designed the trust relationship to serve the interests of the 
United States as well as to benefit the Indian tribes.”276 While some 
statutes could arguably benefit both the United States and the 
tribes, when the interests of the United States, as represented in the 
statute, are in conflict with tribal interests, one should not be able 
to argue that the statute was enacted pursuant to the general trust 
relationship in order to escape judicial scrutiny. This is especially 
true since the Court in both Navajo Nation and Jicarilla Apache 
took the position that trust duties are only created by specific 
statutes and the United States can only be liable for a breach of 
such specific statutory tasks.277  
I have argued earlier, however, that Congress can impose 
regulations under the Indian Commerce Clause that are not related 
to the trust.278 The second argument for invalidating the statutory 
requirement then becomes whether the non-trust purposes of the 
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statute is tied rationally to the restriction being imposed on the 
Navajos.   
In Navajo Nation, the Court found that IMLA did not 
create any specific trust responsibilities.279 But if not pursuant to the 
trust, in what capacity was Secretary Hodel acting?  Why was he 
given the power to approve the lease in the first place if not 
pursuant to his powers as trustee? The Court did not dwell on this 
question. In a long footnote it stated,  
 
[b]eyond doubt, the IMLA was designed “to provide 
Indian tribes with a profitable source of revenue.” 
But Congress had as a concrete objective in that 
regard the removal of certain impediments that had 
applied particularly to mineral leases on Indian land. 
. . .  That impediment-removing objective is discrete 
from the Secretary’s lease approval role under the 
IMLA.280  
 
In other words, while parts of the statute may have been enacted 
for the benefit of the Indians, the lease approval requirement may 
have been there for a totally different reason. Therefore, it seems 
that the Secretary in Navajo Nation was acting as a mere regulator, 
implementing Congress’s power to regulate commerce between 
Indian tribes and non-Indian entities such as Peabody Coal.  
3. Arguing That the Classification Is Not Rationally Related to 
the Purpose of the Law 
Under rational basis review, with or without bite, the statute 
can survive judicial review if the special classification, requiring 
only Indian tribes to get secretarial approval in such instances, is 
rationally tied to the actual purpose behind the legislation. In the 
Navajo case referred to above, the question would be whether 
imposing the approval requirement only in leases involving Navajo 
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land is rationally tied to the real purpose behind the requirement. 
While analyzing whether restrictions on tribal land management 
decisions are rationally related to the real purposes of such statutes 
is beyond the scope of this paper, one should bear in mind that 
what may have been a legitimate governmental interest may 
become illegitimate over the years. Furthermore, it may be that 
while special treatment of Indians may have been at one time 
rationally tied to the government’s effort to protect them, changed 
circumstances may mean what was once considered appropriate 
and rational is now no longer so. As the Court stated in Shelby 
County, Alabama v. Holder,281 in considering the legitimacy of the 
formula for determining which areas were covered by certain 
sections of the Voting Rights Act: 
 
When upholding the constitutionality of the 
coverage formula in 1966, we concluded that it was 
“rational in both practice and theory.” . . . By 2009, 
however, we concluded that the “coverage formula 
raise[d] serious constitutional questions.” As we 
explained, a statute’s “current burdens” must be 
justified by “current needs.” . . . The coverage 
formula met that test in 1965, but no longer does 
so.282   
 
There are a number of precedents involving discrimination 
against women before the Court in 1976 officially adopted 
intermediate scrutiny for discrimination based on gender.283 For 
instance, cases have upheld laws prohibiting women from practicing 
law,284 from voting,285 from being employed in restaurants after 10 
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PM,286 or from being bartenders.287 Although most of these cases 
used rational basis review and upheld such discriminatory 
treatment as not being a denial of equal protection, there is no 
doubt that even under rational basis review, such classifications 
would be held unconstitutional today. 
 Statutes such as 25 U.S.C. § 81, which imposes federal 
approval requirements for tribal land management decisions, have 
their origins in times when the overwhelming majority of Indians 
were illiterate, uneducated, and did not speak English.  An 1873 
Congressional Report covering over 950 pages detailed both how 
unscrupulous white men took advantage of the Indians and why 
such Indians needed special protections and supervisions.288 The 
sub-heading of the Report is indicative of the problems it was 
addressing. It reads: “Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs 
concerning frauds and wrongs committed against the Indians… By 
this investigation and Report the Committee hopes to do something 
to rid the Indians and the Indian Service of those heartless 
scoundrels who infest it, and who do so much damage to the Indian, 
the settler, and the Government.”289 The Report also makes it 
obvious that its authors had a dim view of Indian intellectual 
capabilities. For instance, the Report stated, “[t]he Indians seem to 
be like potters’ clay in the hands of bad men, and are molded at 
their will and pleasure in the management and disposition of their 
property. When the Indians of any tribe have been granted 
individual ownership of property, they have almost invariably been 
induced to sell it to sharpers and heartless men.”290 It is somewhat 
meaningful that this report was issued in 1873, the same year that 
the Supreme Court, in upholding a law prohibiting women from 
practicing law, stated “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of 
women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and 
mother. This is the law of the Creator . . . in view of the peculiar 
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characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the 
province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and 
callings shall be filled and discharged by men.”291      
Just as it is the case with women, society’s views of Indians 
have evolved since 1873. Yet unlike with women, while the statutes 
imposing all kinds of restrictions on Indians have been amended, 
they have never been overturned or repealed, and some of the old 
restrictions are still the law. I believe that a search of the legislative 
history of the various acts of Congress imposing restrictions on 
tribal management decisions would find that many of these 
restrictions have their origins in legislation with purposes that are 
no longer legitimate, or have restrictions which cannot be rationally 
tied to a legitimate governmental purpose.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Indian tribes and their members are probably the only 
entities and people who are subject to federal restrictions on the 
management of their own lands because of their status. While the 
law prevented Indians from successfully challenging these 
restrictions on equal protection grounds, recent development in 
equal protection jurisprudence has opened new possibilities. This 
article has argued that while congressional restrictions imposed on 
Indians pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause do not create 
racial classifications, these laws can be successfully challenged on 
equal protection grounds alleging that they were either enacted 
pursuant to unconstitutional animus or are not rationally tied to the 
true congressional purpose behind the legislation. While legislating 
for the benefit of the tribes pursuant to the trust relationship can 
provide a legitimate governmental purpose for such laws, each law 
should be evaluated on its own merit. Laws imposing federal 
restrictions without any trust obligations creating potential liability 
for their breach, as was the case in the Navajo Nation’s breach of 
trust case, should not be considered as having been enacted for the 
benefit of the Indians pursuant to the trust relationship. 
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